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Seminar Program 
 
Opening 
 
 
Questions Asked and Some Tentative Conclusions 
Colonel, Lic.Pol.Sci Juha Pyykönen 
Director of the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies 
National Defence College 
 
 
The context and the background of the seminar 
 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, to shortly describe the context 
of the seminar’s topic and reiterate the guiding questions asked in the 
opening of the seminar. Secondly, to draw some tentative conclusions 
based on the presentations and discussions during the seminar. In addition, 
as always, an idea of contributing to the development of contemporary 
civilian and military crisis management is also relevant.  
 
The rapid development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
EU has brought us quite far from the beginning of the union, namely the 
status of customs union or the common market. When the European 
Council met in Helsinki in December 1999, the leaders set for themselves a 
new goal that became known as the Helsinki Headline Goal. The Member 
States declared to have a capability to deploy within 60 days up to 60.000 
troops for peacekeeping or peacemaking tasks. The EU member states also 
decided to sustain an operation in the field for up to one year as a 
minimum. This capability was decided to be operational and available, if so 
decided, by mid 2003.  
 
Today, this capability goal has been met, although the EU Rapid Reaction 
Force (EU RRF) has not been tested to the fullest yet. However, a few 
peacekeeping missions have been launched. Pertaining to the topic of the 
9th Suomenlinna seminar, in 2003 the French-led deployment to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo with more than two thousands troops was a 
clear signal that the EU has both the political will and the capability to take 
action, if found necessary. A larger but less risky operation (7,000 troops) 
was commenced in late 2004 when the EUFOR Althea replaced NATO 
peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the time being, the EU has been 
involved in more than ten military and civilian operations in several 
continents gaining valuable collective experience on the field, and several 
hundreds of military personnel are working on a daily basis in the EU 
political and military structures for the fulfilment of the European Security 
Strategy. 
 
 
 
 2
In order to promote further progress of crisis management, the European 
Council has established a set of new military capability goals to be met by 
2010, together with the Civilian Headline Goal to be met by 2008. The new 
military goals are even more ambitious aiming at a capability to rapidly 
deploy military forces for a more high-intensity warfare. In this discussion, 
Africa as a political-military environment for future EU operation has been 
mentioned most often.  
 
The chain of events and goals described above establish the context for the 
topic of the 9th Suomenlinna seminar. In other words, the rationale for the 
topic is to promote further understanding of Africa taking into 
consideration its cultural, historic and social characteristics that make it 
quite different from Europe. In this regard, the question whether the EU is 
up to the challenge for Africa, is regarded both as worth asking and 
answering. The full topic of the seminar, “Promoting Peace and Security in 
Africa”, indicates that the issue at large is related to peace and security thus 
establishing the framework for the debate. 
 
By organising this seminar, we sought to increase our understanding in 
particular on the following four questions,  
 
 First of all, how can we characterise and better understand 
 African conflicts and the complex problemacy that lies beneath 
 them? 
 
 Secondly, can we achieve a consistent approach between 
 African and European actors in terms of crisis management?  
 
 Thirdly, what challenges are involved with European crisis 
 management in Africa?  
 
 Finally, what is or should be the future role of European peace 
 support operations in Africa? 
 
The programme of our two-day seminar was structured into six sessions. 
The presentations of the first session elaborated the nature of African 
insecurity, whereas the second session concentrated on the challenges of 
European crises management in Africa. The focus of the third session was 
on the dialogue between the two continents. The fourth session elaborated 
then African responses to regional security threats, followed by a session 
devoted to Africa on the agenda of the European Security and Defence 
Policy. Finally, the last session dealt with the future prospects of European 
Union peace support operations in Africa. 
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Tentative conclusions and some findings 
 
Regarding the results of the two-day seminar, it is self-evident that the 
following ‘first impression report’ cannot cover all and is subjective by 
nature. Wide experience and high quality of expertise of the speakers and 
other participants make it even more challenging to draw conclusions. Of 
course, numerous questions still remain unanswered and readers may 
derive their individual reflections based on the following chapters. 
 
Out of the four questions asked in the opening, the first two were related to 
a common understanding of the basics. Presenters used numerous examples 
illuminating the complexity of issues that should be tackled. At the state or 
provincial level, high number of parties and actors involved each having 
different interests, tribal cultures, exclusive ethnicities and scarce natural 
resources together creates a set for the game that seems to be 
uncontrollable. At an individual level, various forces and groupings, 
guerrillas and mercenaries prevent effectively improvement of living 
conditions, level of security, economics or governance. Assurance of 
secure environment at all levels was commonly regarded as a precondition 
for better governance and the existence of a civil society. Economic growth 
at all levels was recognised as a necessity.  
 
Participants discussed in depth about areas and issues that need action 
taken by African or European parties. The crisis cycle follows the same 
track than is the case elsewhere: some weeks of intensive fighting; a 
regional or international intervention enforcing a cease-fire; international 
organisations commence programmes for, inter alia, disarmament, 
demobilisation and reconstruction aiming at a lasting peace including 
overarching reconciliation. Some doubts were cast on the role of state-
building and possible effectiveness of rule of law and national institutions 
as guiding bodies for inhabitants. As an alternative, religion, faith and 
prejudices as well as local traditions and habits could have a major impact 
in behaviour.  
 
The remaining two questions could be merged into one asking for the 
acceptability of European way of getting involved in the crisis management 
in Africa. One of the contradicting themes was the role for the African 
states and organisations in crisis management. Recent experience where 
tangible activities in crisis management have been the responsibility for 
African parties, was found encouraging and worth further development. In 
the current debate in Europe, the conclusion is that a more comprehensive 
and coordinated approach is vital for future EU crisis management 
operations. For African force contributors, participants seemed to wish for 
more coordination among the states.  
 
A rather wide support was evident towards the emerging African Union’s 
policy to get involved in the crisis situation even in a case where 
sovereignty of a state would be at stake. Consequently, the role for the EU 
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could be for instance assistance in training as well as financial, logistic and 
materiel support. This is not necessarily in line with the vision expressed in 
the European Security Strategy dated 12 Dec 2003, and could be too 
modest for the EU. This view could be supported with the fact that the EU 
is the major financial contributor to African development projects. Some 
participants stated that the colonial history of some EU Members States 
could bring some negative flavour for their active role in African crisis 
management operations.  
 
The already existing expertise and knowledge in crisis management should 
be utilised more extensively in the future. This is especially relevant in 
relation to the root causes of conflicts as well as in relation to civil society. 
Some cases of positive outcome were addressed as examples of tangible 
success. 
 
The four questions could also be answered together, because both the issue 
of common understanding of the basics and the issue looking for an 
acceptable way for the EU to assist Africa are intertwined. Several 
participants wished for open discussions and debates between the African 
and European parties as a major remedy in relation to the common 
understanding of the basics. If one would prefer a more profound and 
ambitious approach, a shared view on core values and norms of crisis 
management and necessary capabilities and assets for civilian and military 
operations could be a solution. Furthermore, and as the second step, a 
commonly agreed set of crisis management concepts, doctrines, procedures 
etc. could be established. As an example, this would also serve as a solid 
basis for further development of African Stand-by Forces, Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR). It would also help the EU to provide more appropriate assistance 
and support for Africa without endangering the idea of African Ownership.  
 
In relation to an acceptable European way of supporting and assisting 
Africa, one could prefer an honest co-operation to overcome security 
problems in the continent. Practical remedies were proposed by some of the 
presenters. An issue of division of labour between the African and the 
European actors was also addressed. As already mentioned above, one way 
ahead could be to leave implementation of military crisis management 
operations for the African parties, and let the EU to concentrate mainly on 
support, logistic and assisting activities. This could also include an idea of 
focusing on civilian crisis management, such as DDR and SSR.  
 
In general, it became self-evident that more cooperation is a necessity in 
order to promote further clarification of the basics as well as a shared 
understanding of crisis management. Consequently, African and European 
experts and professionals must be brought together to do the work for 
enhanced security for all the peoples on the two continents.  
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African Crises – Challenges for International Community and 
Local Actors 
Ambassador Kari Karanko 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
 
 
The United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
recognised the severe complexity in addressing conflicts. The report states 
that "the unprecedented success (in crises management and resolution) was 
also coupled with major failures. Mediation produced settlement in only 
about 25 per cent of civil wars and only some of those attracted the 
political and material resources necessary for successful implementation. 
As a result, many implementation efforts failed, sometimes with disastrous 
consequences. If two peace agreements, in 1991, Biocesse Agreement for 
Angola and the Arusha Accords for Rwanda, had been successfully 
implemented, deaths attributable to war in 1990s would have been reduced 
by several million...The large loss of life in such wars and outbreaks of 
mass violence obliges the international community to be more vigilant in 
preventing them. When prevention fails, there is urgent need to stop the 
killing and prevent any further return to war." 
 
We are encouraged of the results of the growth in post-war conflict 
countries viz. those still within a struggle for democracy and peaceful 
development as shown in the example by the UK´s Commission for Africa 
report (2005 - World Bank source 2004): 
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Economic growth in both Uganda and Mozambique has been significant 
whereas in DRC despite her enormous resources economic stagnation is 
evident. Many other examples from Africa already to day give strong 
evidence of successful peace negotiations and development work towards 
sustainable peace. 
 
The cornerstones of strategic peace building for sustainable peace are 
guaranteed by 
 
1. Providing security after successful peace agreement, disarmament, 
demobilisation of different armed fractions and reintegration of the 
soldiers into their respective societies including repatriation of 
refugees and IDP (Internally Displaces Persons) 
2. Providing means and resources for the initial development efforts 
in rebuilding and reconstruction, economic activities, health and 
education facilities and especially for guaranteeing food security 
3. Reconstruction of the justice system and institutions of the rule of 
law as well as addressing trauma and providing therapy. 
 
Peace cannot however be sustainable if the reconciliation process is not 
initiated and the healing of the society started.  
 
In mid May, 2006 in Hämeenlinna five days before the Suomenlinna-
seminar, Bishop of Tampere Mr. Juha Pihkala carried on the funeral service 
of 3 500 unconsecrated bodies of victims of the civil war in 1918 just after 
the Finnish independence. We have asked here in Finland if 88 years is loo 
late for reconciliation. Our answer has been that reconciliation is necessary 
and good examples from South Africa and also from Burundi and Rwanda 
show that reconciliation process is one of the fundamentals for building 
sustainable peace. We have to ask especially in Western Africa if 200 years 
since the devastating effects of the slavery are root causes for the mistrust 
and divisions in the modern states with problems added by colonial 
boundaries. Many national boundaries demarcated to the rivers and lakes 
divided people and tribes rather than provided patterns for unification and 
healthy nation building.  
 
World community has developed methods for early warning in crises 
prevention. Actions taken by world community and regional bodies before 
actual conflicts will be less costly than managing actual crises. Therefore 
indicators and criteria for possible conflict development are necessary. 
World Bank Institute has developed a world-wide method to follow-up 
development, which may possibly lead into crises. 
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? Voice and Accountability - measuring political, civil and human 
rights  
? Political Instability and Violence - measuring the likelihood of 
violent threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism  
? Government Effectiveness - measuring the competence of the 
bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery  
? Regulatory Burden - measuring the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies  
? Rule of Law - measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, including judiciary independence, and the 
incidence of crime  
? Control of Corruption - measuring the abuse of public power for 
private gain, including petty and grand corruption (and state 
capture by elites) 
 
Country based analysis on biannual basis can be found on their pages: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi 
 
Establishment of the United Nations Peace Building Commission will help 
the world community and regional organisations in their coordinated 
actions in peace building. DDR and SSR processes can not be successful 
without engaging well coordinated and harmonized development efforts by 
all actors to help war torn nations and affected people to recover. As 
processes DDR and SSR can be described with the following way: 
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration + repatriation of 
refugees and IDPs and reconciliation process 
 
? DDR is a crucial part of a successful peace building process and 
a key to political stability 
? Disarmament means the collection, control and disposal of small 
arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms 
management programmes in a post-conflict context  
? Demobilization is defined as a planned process by which the 
armed force of the government and/or opposition or factional 
forces either downsize or completely disband 
? Reintegration is the process whereby former combatants and their 
families are integrated into the social, economic and political life of 
civilian communities 
? DDR can be a demilitarization process after a decisive victory or a 
part of a peace settlement 
? Challenges for all parties and especially for the donor community 
is the risk that hostilities may resume 
? +R+R = repatriation of refugees and IDPs and Reconciliation is 
important 
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SSR Security System Reform 
 
? SSR extends beyond the more traditional security assistance on 
defence, intelligence and policing 
? SSR is a key component of the broader human security agenda. 
The key idea is that security and development are 
interconnected 
? The security system reform seeks to create a secure environment 
that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy 
? The security system includes the following actors: Core security 
actors; Security management and oversight bodies; Justice and law 
enforcement institutions; Non-statutory security forces 
? Challenges: SSR comprises the most sensitive areas of state 
control. Also  “war on terror” threatens to shift the concept of 
security back to the traditional security  
 
One of the key areas for work on conflict resolution is building a just 
society and reconstruction of the institutions of rule of law. Key elements 
for the just society in practice are: 
 
? Reconstruction or establishing judiciary system and institutions 
such as courts, prosecution, prison services and police 
? Recruitment of judges, capacity building and guarantees to provide 
services in efficient manner with respect of individual rights 
? In post-conflict (transitional justice) situations it is important to 
ensure that perpetrators of war crimes are taken to court and 
punished 
? Overhaul democratic institutions in order to maintain separate 
legislative powers, governmental duties and juridical powers and 
support free media as watch-dog 
? Enhancement of basic rights and liberties and human rights, 
including minority rights and gender concern 
 
When addressing DDR, SSR, rule of law and just society and development 
we recognize that it is very difficult to draw strict borderlines between 
various actors involved in the development and implementation of various 
tasks. Military and civilian peace keeping and peace building need a special 
emphasis for interconnectivity and efforts for interoperability. International 
and regional actors, donor community and various non-governmental actors 
need to day a much better coordination than ever before. 
 
Our common concern is to promote dialogue, security and structural 
stability towards sustainable peace and development in Africa. We have 
some common goals, internationally accepted principles for our work like: 
? poverty reduction (reaching the MDG-targets) 
? need to obtain sustainable economic growth 
? internationally accepted principles to reach democracy and good 
governance 
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? acceptance for free media 
? elements and institutions for supporting human rights 
? goals towards gender equality  
? sustainable use and control of natural resources (Kimberley 
process, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EU-FLEGT-
initiative on illegal logging) 
? struggle against HIV/AIDS and other pandemics and  
? reduktion of corruption 
 
We celebrate in Finland this year the 50th anniversary of our engagement in 
United Nations peace keeping operations. Finland has had in those 
operations nearly 50 000 men and at the moment we have some 800 peace 
keepers in various operations round the world. Our training operations of 
peace keepers are famous and international courses are arranged in Finland 
and elsewhere. We have to keep in mind that according the United Nations 
statistic the top-ten list of contributors to the military peace keeping and 
police operations countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are 
providing the most forces for international peace keeping operations: 
 
 
African Union which was building on OAU in 2002 is the main actor for 
peace and security and development on regional level in Africa. European 
Union has committed in her Africa strategy (15702/1/05 14.12.2005) to 
engage towards the peace and security agenda in Africa and support of the 
sub regional organisations like SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD and others.  
 
 
 
 12
In the strategy EU states that "without peace there can be no lasting 
development. Without African leadership to end African conflicts there can 
be no lasting peace." So we will as stated in the strategy: 
 
a. Work with the African Union (AU), sub-regional organisations and 
African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, 
including by addressing its root causes, and to keep the peace in 
their own continent. In particular, we will strengthen the Africa 
Peace Facility with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable 
funding. We will help develop African capabilities, such as the 
AU’s African Standby Force, and will build on existing activities 
by Member States to provide training and advisory, technical, 
planning and logistical support.  
 
b. Provide direct support to African Union, sub-regional or UN 
efforts to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) activities, and military and civilian crisis 
management missions, including potential deployment of EU battle 
groups; continue implementation of the ESDP Africa Action Plan; 
and develop the dialogue with Euromed countries.  
 
c. Enhance our support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa, so 
that we secure lasting peace and development. We will support in 
particular the new UN Peacebuilding Commission; the 
strengthening of fragile states; and Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration, and Security Sector Reform Programmes in 
African states. 
 
d. Redouble our efforts to stem the illicit flow of weapons, including 
small arms. We will encourage others to adopt minimum common 
standards and associate themselves with the EU Code of Conduct 
on Arms exports, discourage transfers which contribute to 
instability, develop ways to share and act on Information on illegal 
trafficking and support border management controls and 
international arms Trade treaty.  
 
e. Join with African states to counter terrorism worldwide. We will 
provide technical assistance, enhanced information sharing and 
support to the AU Anti-Terrorism Centre in Algiers and continue to 
Support the implementation of international counter-terrorism 
agreements.  
 
European Union has besides her security and defence policy means also as 
community (commission and 25 member countries) biggest resources for 
engaging peace and security efforts with development means and resources 
for successful work towards sustainable peace in Africa.  
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The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment 
Henri Boshoff, Military Analyst, African Security Analysis Programme, 
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. 
 
 
Introduction   
 
It is unfortunate that “Africa” has become synonymous with conflict, 
increasingly violent and protracted. Since the establishment of the new 
regional organisation, the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security 
Commission (PSO) much has been done to address ongoing conflict in 
Africa. Peacekeeping operations, initiated by both the AU and the United 
Nations are ongoing in Central and West Africa. Soldiers of troop 
contributing countries are daily confronted by the realities of the African 
conflict environment. The battle space is characterised by famine and 
internal displaced people, refugees, HIV/AIDS, child soldiers etc. Most of 
the conflicts in Africa are within the state, intra state and not between 
states. The biggest casualties are unfortunate civilians.      
 
This chapter will first contextualise the global debate and the position of 
Africa, the current nature of conflict, the impact of conflict, the African 
battle space and a conclusion.  
  
 
The Global Context  
 
Africa, as a very small player in the context of the formal global economy, 
reacts more violently to the squalls and gales worked up by market 
sentiment than do larger states upon whose experience most generalisation 
on political economy and security are based. At the same time as Africa is 
swept along in the economic torrent, the international political environment 
has also become less favourable in terms of systemic stability. Contrary to 
most popular expectations the end of bipolar rivalry has made the world an 
altogether more peaceful place. Ironically, the end of the Cold War has 
contributed to the threat of Africa’s marginalisation in world affairs. The 
end of bipolar superpower rivalry has robbed Africa of whatever strategic 
significance it had. Suddenly the continent and it supporters have an 
extraordinary task ahead of them to convince increasingly hard-headed 
policy-makers in the rich North of the need to assist a region whose 
problematic economies and poor future prospects seem less and less 
relevant to the growth of richer countries. 
 
The end of the Cold War implied a restriction of policy choices for the 
majority of African states. Caught in a massive and deepening economic 
crisis characterised by the debt trap their choice of ideology and aid 
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sponsors has been restricted by organisations such as the World Bank, the 
G8 and the United States of America. The absence of policy choices in 
ostensibly democratic systems also means that political competition may be 
stripped of ideas and reduced to a naked struggle for fruit of office. It has 
also meant that African countries have to indulge the fantasies of the 
radical free-marketers, despite the incompatibility of the economy and 
political courses being advocated for these very weak states. In the case of 
Africa it is clear that the argument about the interconnectedness of political 
and economic liberalisation is based upon dubious premises. Structural 
adjustment programmes have played no small part in destabilising the 
political framework.  
 
Over the past decade a number of general trends and prominent 
characteristics of the international strategic environment have become 
clearly visible. These are also applicable in Africa: 
 
 a. Intra-state Conflict. The likelihood of inter-state conflicts has 
decline considerably with the termination of the Cold War. The vast 
majority of contemporary armed conflicts are taking place within the state. 
Africa is no exception and most ongoing conflicts in Africa take place 
within the state. Although occurring within states, the consequences of 
such conflicts in terms of refugee flows, the trafficking of small arms, and 
the disruption of trade, have profound spill over effects on neighbouring 
states. Equally, in situations where neighbouring states sponsor warring 
parties of an intra-state conflict, attempts to achieve a resolution are often 
frustrated. 
 b. The Contribution of Non-State Actors to Insecurity. The 
capacity of non-state actors to instigate and conduct armed conflict is 
significantly influencing the international strategic environment. Such 
actors include trans-national criminal organisations, mercenaries, rebel 
movements, warlords and militia. The rise of international terrorism has 
highlighted the lethal capacity of non-state actors. 
 c. The Rise of International Terrorism. Events within the global 
security environment have compelled recognition that international 
terrorism poses a serious security threat. Indeed, terrorism has become less 
territorially defined and more global in reach, including Africa. In addition, 
it assumes a level of anonymity that is increasingly driven by non-state 
actors. No country can be considered to be immune from acts of 
international terrorism and all are affected by the way in which the world 
responds to this threat. 
 d. The Military Capacity of States. While most states have 
retained their national armed forces and reduced their military spending, 
some have strengthened their military capacity. At the global strategic 
level, military power continues to be exercised alongside the economic and 
 15
political strengths of states. Of great concern is the use of such capacity to 
pursue unilateral military action in resolving disputes. 
 e. Competition over Scarce and Strategic Resources. The security 
environment is significantly influenced by the competition for access to 
scarce and strategic resources such as water, land oil and gas. Some 
countries see the interruption in the supply of natural resources of having 
severe economic consequences; they consider the protection of the supply 
of strategic resources as a significant national security concern1. Some of 
Africa’s conflicts are the direct result of foreign and domestic competition 
over the access to such scarce and strategic resources that are found on the 
continent. 
 f. Mercenaries and Private Military Companies. The nature of the 
activities of mercenaries and their participation in armed conflict has often 
been controversial. The controversy arises especially when mercenaries 
provide military services in violation of domestic and international norms. 
However, attempts to address this issue have been complicated by the 
difficulty of achieving a universal and concise definition of mercenarism as 
opposed to activities of private military and security companies. 
Mercanarism is a manifestation of unregulated military foreign assistance 
and has the potential to undermine legitimate constitutional democracies 
and the consolidation of collective security especially in Africa. 
 g. Globalisation. The cultural, economic, social and political 
process of globalisation is characteristics of the hyper-mobility of 
information and capital. The fundamental driver of the globalisation 
process is the rapid advancement in technology over the past decade. 
However, access to such technological advancements is a challenge for 
most people in the developing world, in general and in Africa. In a 
globalising world, ‘….no country or individual, no matter how remote 
remains unaffected by security-related developments.’2
 h. North-South Disparities. While globalisation has increased 
opportunities for economic growth and development in some parts of the 
world, there has been an increase in the disparity between the rich and poor 
countries of the world. As a result there is now a major fault line regarding 
the levels of development and wealth between the countries of the north 
and those of the south, as the latter become progressively poorer. This trend 
has grave implications for the development and hence the security of 
countries in the South, including Africa. 
 i. Regionalism. The movement towards the consolidation of 
regional economic blocs continue. In the past years the expansion of the 
European Union bears testimony to this trend in international relations. 
Together with other regional economic blocs in the world, emphasis has 
                                                
1 Klare, M. The New Geography of Conflict. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2001.  
2 Kasrils, R. Reviewing National Security after Ten Years of Democracy. National 
Security Conference, CSIR, October 2004. 
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been on the facilitation of intra-regional trade. Increasingly though, there is 
a noticeable movement towards the consolidation of regional security 
mechanisms. 
 j. Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Modern 
information and communication technology and systems are critical for 
commerce, trade and military operations. At the same time the presence of 
such technology and systems creates its own set of security challenges. The 
international community through the UN has undertaken to pursue 
mechanisms that will promote international cyber-security. 
 
 
The African Context 
 
The African continent continues to find itself within an international 
system structured and driven along clear lineages of economic, political 
and military power. The inauguration of the African Union is, therefore a 
milestone in Africa’s quest for a dignified and equitable place in such a 
world3. Proxy wars that were fought on the continent in furtherance of bi-
polar competition during the Cold War have ended. Nevertheless, conflicts 
and the use of force have continued. While some of these conflicts are 
based on longstanding disputes, others are of a recent occurrence. 
 
Contemporary conflicts and insecurity in Africa emanate from, among 
other factors: Weak and dysfunctional states; poor political and economic 
governance; the politicisation of ethnicity; armed competition over scarce 
and strategic resources; the involvement of the military in the political and 
economic governance of states; and unconstitutional changes of 
governments. 
Of greater concern for the security of Africa is: 
 
a. Poverty and underdevelopment; 
b. Proliferation of small arms, light weapons and child soldiers. 
c. Unlawful activities of mercenaries and non-state actors in 
armed conflict;  
d. Inter and intra-state conflict; 
e. The continent can be used as a base for international terrorist 
groups as well as a target for their activities; and 
f. Increased piracy along Africa’s Coast.   
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Mbeki, T. This is Africa’s Time. The African Union Directory, 2002. 
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The current Nature of Conflict in Africa 
 
A recent survey of wars and conflict in Africa over the last decade reveals 
the following: 
 
a.  Any intense war fighting is limited to an average of 3 weeks 
b.  Forces engaged in such intense fighting number only a few 
thousands, are secretive, highly mobile and assisted by limited air power, 
especially transport. Contingents engaged in the fighting also sometimes 
enjoy the support of governments/states and has elements of conventional 
and militia units integrated. There purpose is to create dominant conditions 
for a more long-term rebel force to hold. 
 
 
The impact of Conflict on Africa  
 
The impact of wars and conflict is diverse and debilitating creating 
demands not only for a capacity to stop violence but also major 
interventions towards responding to humanitarian needs. A summary of 
some of the areas include: 
 
a. Wilful destruction of infrastructure and in some cases leaving 
behind landmines that for years will deny large tracts of land to be used 
productively unless rehabilitated. 
b. Conflicts within states, still largely based on ethnic and regional 
differences tend to flow beyond the borders and exacerbate ethnic 
cleavages that ultimately undermine state formation and regional security. 
c.  Many countries are still in that twilight zone of ‘no-war-no-
peace’ represented most graphically by Northern Uganda, a region that has 
not known peace since 1986 and is now host to over 1.2 million refugees/ 
Internal Displaced People (IDPs). The majority of countries in this category 
can be described as highly vulnerable states. 
d. The forced and rapid dispersion of population groups into 
categories of the intelligentsia and professional classes fleeing into 
exile/Diaspora, others into refugee camps and the rest reduced to internally 
displaced peoples (IDPs). Of those remaining behind, Africa has 
experienced at least three genocides in the last ten years: Rwanda, DR 
Congo and in Darfur. This is the worst form of human rights violations 
known to man and is a phenomenon that has almost disappeared in major 
parts of the world. In statistical terms, there are over 9 million registered 
refugees throughout the world, the majority of which are in Africa while 
the continent is also host to a conservatively estimated 15 – 17 million 
IDPs. 
 e.  Major flight of capital and foreign direct investment 
 f. Regions of the continent characterised by lack of security 
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The African Battle Space   
 
The African battle space is influenced by religion conflict, HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, landmines, famine, small arms, child soldiers cross border crime, 
poaching and fundamentalism. Because of the complexity of the battle 
space is it very difficult for peacekeeping forces to operate in Africa. The 
following map of Africa explains this phenomenon.   
Official Structures
1.  Governments.
2.  Military.
3.  Religion/Missionaries.
4.  Population.
5.  Tribes/Ethnic groups.
6.  Police.
7.  Intelligence Orgs.
8.  Local Authorities.
9.  Media.
10.Dictators.
12.Allied military forces. 
Unofficial 
Structures
1.  War lords.
2.  Mercenaries.
3.  Refugees.
4.  Illegal Immigrants.
5.  Terrorists.
6.  Militias.
7.  Liberation Groups.
8.  Petty criminals.
9.  Failed States
Regional/Sub Regional
Structures
1.  OAU.
2.  SADC.
3.  MAGREB.
4.  IGADD etc
5.  NGOs.
INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES
1.  UN.
2.  Transnational Corporations
3.  NGOs and HRDs.
4.  Global criminal networks.
5.  External governments.
6.  Military training teams.
7.  Financial organisations.
8.  Media.
Privatised Security
     1.  MPRI.
     2.  EO.
     3.  Gray.
     4.  Saracen etc.    
PHYSICAL NATURE
1.  Bad infrastructure.
2.  Rural.
3.  Urban.
4.  Squatter.
5.  Disease.
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Conclusion   
 
Any peacekeeping or intervention force that has to deploy on the African 
continent must take note of the characteristics of the African conflict 
environment. Peacekeepers have to take note that they will find themselves 
in an environment in which state power is either challenged or eroded, 
sometimes to the point of non-existence. Administrative structures may be 
fragile or impotent, replaced by non-state actors if at all. Physical 
infrastructure may be decayed to a point where communications, water 
supply and medical facilities have to be brought in to an area where a force 
is to be deployed. A peacekeeping force will certainly need high levels of 
logistical support, especially in areas where the physical environment itself 
is essentially hostile. Local populations will probably also see in relatively 
prosperous expeditionary force myriad opportunities to enhance their 
survival. The distinction between a military operation and disaster relief 
may become uncomfortably blurred. Administrative and logistical skills 
may be in greater demand than those associated with orthodox soldering. 
 
Not all the parties that peacekeepers shall encounter will be under effective 
control or even recognised by the incumbent government. Peacekeepers 
will need to understand the political and social environment very quickly to 
avoid unfortunate and costly entanglement in the local processes. Any 
peacekeeping or intervention force inevitably becomes part of the local 
political and diplomatic environment and constitutes a resource to be 
exploited in various ways by local actors. 
 
In conclusion, this means that deploying on the African continent, you need 
an appropriate force design, heavier in skills such as engineering, logistics, 
intelligence and communication than usually deployed on the conventional 
battle field.    
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Promoting Peace and Security in Africa: Is the European 
Union up to the Challenge? - A Sociological Perspective 
H.E. Josef Bucher 
Ambassador of Switzerland to Finland 
 
 
I have placed my contribution to this seminar publication under the title “A 
Sociological Perspective on the Transition from War to Peace”. It is the 
fruit of some observations I made during a few years I spent in the region 
between the Great Lakes and the Horn of  Africa. In other words, my 
exposure to African reality has been limited in time and space, and these 
considerations are therefore limited in more than one sense. 
  
With these limitations in mind, and the assignment given by the organizers, 
I am in no position to give ready-made solutions for what could be done. I 
just invite you to join me on a journey, where I will try to share with you 
some concerns that burden my mind. I offer no answers, but questions; no 
certainties, but doubts. 
 
I feel that there is a growing awareness, within as well as outside the UN 
system, that there is a big gap between “peacekeeping” and “development”, 
with all the risks that this implies of falling back into violent conflicts. And 
it is on this gap that I wish to focus your attention. 
 
What is the link between the cause of a conflict and the consequence of 
a conflict?  
 
This is not the place for elaborating all the reasons for internal conflicts, 
since some speakers have already done this earlier, But on a certain level of 
abstraction we can observe, first, how institutional failure leads to conflict. 
Because of the way power is distributed and exercised within society, parts 
of that society are driven to violent rebellion. 
 
Second, we can observe how conflicts damage the institutions further, 
either by intent, making a tabula rasa, or by neglect, warlordism and chaos. 
As a result, conflict-affected societies face an institutional vacuum when 
they move out of a conflict situation. 
 
When I refer to power and the way in which power is exercised within a 
given society, I mean decision-making power regarding access to resources 
such as land and water as well as power over immaterial goods, such as 
access to justice, to information and to the political system. 
 
Here the role of institutions comes into play. Institutions are the containers 
of power, their role is to contain power. That is why they are so immensely 
important.  
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In that sense we may compare institutions to structures built by civil 
engineers, which are aimed at controlling the physical power of nature. 
Look at the great civil works made along the rivers, how they are built to 
contain and to channel the physical force of water. Cascades, which brake 
the speed of the water in the mountain river. Dams, which contain the sea, 
or the rising water of rivers in the plain. Planted trees, which prevent the 
snow from forming avalanches with their destructive power. We can 
understand and conceive of institutions in a similar way. 
 
Civil wars damage or destroy the institutions that should contain the power. 
The institutional emptiness or deficiency that follows may be the biggest 
challenge for a transition from war to peace. In an institutional vacuum 
there is nothing that contains the power, there is no stable constellation that 
allows power to check power. 
 
Therefore, all too often the way out of a conflict situation is simply the 
reconstruction of workable institutions: institutions that provide basic 
protection; institutions that manage to deliver justice in a bearable manner; 
and institutions that provide a fair distribution of resources. 
 
Therein lies the hidden link between the cause and the result of a conflict: 
The failure of institutions to contain power – as a start, and the institutions 
as a casualty of the war – at the end. This is the vicious circle, the recurring 
failure of institutions to contain power.  
 
In this light the World Bank study entitled "Breaking the Conflict Trap" 
reaches the conclusion that civil war has to be seen as the major cause of 
another civil war. 
 
Rehabilitation of institutions or import of institutions? 
 
Filling this institutional vacuum is a great challenge. It is both difficult and 
urgent. Francis Fukuyama, in his recent book “State-Building”, emphasizes 
that there is a great deal we do not know about how to transfer strong 
institutions to developing countries.  
 
We know how to transfer resources across international borders, we know 
how to organize a humanitarian operation in the most remote places, we 
know how to project military power into a hostile environment. But the 
institutional transfer remains a challenge because well-functioning public 
institutions require certain habits of mind, and they operate in complex 
ways that resist being moved.  
 
Institutions resist being moved as they form and are part of a society’s 
history. Francis Fukuyama concludes that strengthening self-sustaining 
institutions thus becomes a central project of contemporary international 
politics. 
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The first phase of state-building concerns what has come to be called post-
conflict reconstruction and applies to countries emerging from violent 
conflict, where state authority has collapsed and needs to be rebuilt from 
the ground up. Here the issue for outside powers is the short-term provision 
of stability.  
 
If the collapsed state is fortunate enough to achieve some stability with 
international help, the second phase comes into play. Here, the chief 
objective is to create self-sustaining state institutions that can survive the 
withdrawal of outside intervention. But as we do not know how to transfer 
institutional capacity in a hurry, we are setting ourselves and our supposed 
beneficiaries up for serious disappointments.  
 
Institutions can be defined in many ways, but they are a set of formal or 
informal rules, norms and processes regulating individual and collective 
behaviour. However, individual and collective behaviour is culturally 
determined. Therefore, for institutions to be successful, they must reflect 
the cultural underpinning of a particular society. Not only must they reflect 
cultural underpinning, they are also part and parcel of these cultural 
underpinnings.  
 
In other words, since institutions have to contain power, and the 
institutional balance has to provide a system where by power checks 
power, institutions must be rooted in culture and political perception, they 
must mirror the social structure of a given society. If they are not rooted 
well, they offer no barrier to the force of power, and offer no resistance to 
the violence of a storm. 
 
This "enracinement" of institutions can also be understood in dialectical 
terms: if institutions regulate individual or collective behaviour, they can 
do so only because individual and collective behaviour give them sense and 
legitimacy.  
 
Heart transplantations fail if there is not full compatibility. We know the 
consequence: the patient dies. Institutional transplantations fail if there is a 
lack of compatibility. We know the consequence: a failing state. That is 
why institutional rehabilitation is better than the import of institutions.  
 
Who would object, in theory, that institutions have to grow? Hardly 
anyone. Who wants to cultivate institutions on the local ground? Hardly 
anyone. Why is that so? There is one critical factor: time, the lack of 
patience for letting things grow.  
 
But institutions have to grow, to grow like trees, like plants and flowers, 
like people and their culture. The process is very slow. At the end of a long 
day, there is always a great temptation, the temptation of taking a short cut. 
Could one not artificially speed up the process? The temptation of over-
fertilizing our plant.  
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Cutting short means saving time – or rather, it aims at saving time. 
However, acting under great time pressure means raising expectations 
beyond what a society can handle, beyond what a damaged political order 
can cope with. To underline this point let us look closely at three elements 
of which we are tempted to expect too much: law, civil society and money. 
 
Expecting too much of law   
 
In modern western countries, formal law (law adopted by a formal 
institution, in a capital of a recognised state, and law shaped by 
international trends and standards) has developed over years, according to 
very diverse philosophical trends, and a long history of secularisation. 
However, in other societies, where social behaviour is mainly shaped by 
tradition, by informal laws and by religious beliefs, how relevant is 
modern, abstract law? How can we expect a law to guide and to protect the 
people where the mere legitimacy of this formal law is very weak? 
 
But there is more. Law itself does not provide justice or protection. It does 
not impose itself. It needs the power of an institution. In the institutional 
vacuum I have mentioned, there is no institutional protection for the law. It 
has no hands, no teeth. We expect too much of the law. 
 
Expecting too much of civil society  
 
After the failure of building states in Africa, many agencies and writers 
took the escape route called “civil society”, out of despair, and “faute de 
mieux” - and got us all confused in the process. They made us believe that 
civil society could deliver where the state had failed. 
 
However, civil society cannot replace the state, and it certainly cannot 
replace the institutions. It is rather the other way around, civil society needs 
institutional protection to prosper. Civil society can be used to establish 
institutions, but it cannot replace them. That is expecting too much of civil 
society. 
 
The universal remedy for overcoming these deficiencies: money 
 
Money should do the trick, financial assistance should bridge the gap. But 
are we not expecting too much of money? Financial assistance against 
poverty is important - but poverty is often the result of war, the result of 
failing institutions. Financial assistance to make the state function is 
important - but often it is legitimacy that the state lacks most.  
 
All the money talk contains a message: that financial assistance may free 
you from a lot of homework, and an implicit message: that money can buy 
the solution. Is this message not preparing the ground for more corruption? 
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I wonder sometimes if there is another route, like learning how to manage 
poverty? 
 
To manage poverty does mean that even poor societies have to be just and 
fair, instead of creating the illusion that greater wealth will solve the 
distribution issue. A poor society has to manage very carefully its wealth 
distribution. In fact, according to the World Bank study, those poor 
societies that have extremely unequally distributed income are most 
vulnerable to civil war.  
 
To manage poverty, to distribute fairly very limited resources, represents 
an immense challenge, but it would help to avoid many civil wars. That 
crystallizes the great importance of the institution.  
 
Conclusions 
 
What does this add up to? I would say that in a transition phase from war to 
peace, we have above all to rescue what can be rescued locally, and this on 
three tracks: 
 
? to rescue what is left of local institutions. Seemingly archaic and 
informal institutions are no less relevant than modern ones. What 
has grown in time within tribal societies, what has grown in clans 
and communities is still most useful to stabilize them today. What 
has grown locally is less prone to corruption and distortion.  
 
? to rehabilitate customary law, and gradually to reform it, because 
customary law contains the seeds of any rule of law, and because 
customary law provides justice to the poor man.  
 
? to mobilise local knowledge, knowledge about their environment, 
about ways of solving conflicts among them, knowledge about 
their culture and their history which form the core of their identity.  
 
All three tracks may offer us new challenges, but in highlighting them, I 
have reached the end of my journey.  
 
If there is one question which might be carried further in this seminar, I 
would dare to ask: How does foreign intervention affect the growth of 
indigenous institutions? How does it affect the rehabilitation of customary 
law? And how can foreign intervention help to mobilize local knowledge? 
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Africa as an Operational Environment 
By COL Nicolas Richoux 
Ministry of Defence of France 
 
 
Introduction 
 
EU troops are currently being deployed in DRC in support of the MONUC. 
It is a new challenge for many participating nations, which have no 
experience in Africa matters. This is the second big EU operation (after 
ARTEMIS in 2003) but there is no denying that it will not be the last. 
Africa is facing huge difficulties today and Europe is more and more 
involved in peace enforcement and peace keeping operations all over the 
world. Sooner or later such an operation in Africa will happen again.  
 
Therefore, we have to consider into details the features of the whole area in 
order to be aware of the great variety of this continent. First of all, we must 
consider that there is not one a single continent but several different Africa: 
 
? Almost 30 % of the whole territory is occupied by desert. The 
desert limits are also more or less the limits of Islam in the north, 
? in the centre, it can be found savannah jungle and forests, 
? in the south, bush and desert too. 
 
So it is a huge continent wherever you go, the role of logistics will be 
primordial and the time you will need to fulfil your mission will really 
depend on the local situation. You don’t move in the desert, like in the 
savannah or in the jungle. Geography and climate features will have a deep 
impact on the operational preparation. According to the country where you 
will be deployed, the health and sanitary rules will be quite different too. 
 
 
General Features  
 
a. Natural resources 
 
Africa is potentially a very rich country with all kinds of oil and mineral 
resources. Nevertheless, it must be compared with the real poverty of the 
continent and the poverty level of its inhabitants. As a matter of fact, 
wealth is confiscated by a minority, profitable to few persons or ethnic 
groups, most of the time those who are in power with their families, their 
close relationship. This situation is favoured by a high level of corruption 
and incapacity of weak and poor states. 
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b. Borders 
 
Borders are artificial and inherited from the colonial time. They don’t 
match the real ethnic settlements. Thus, they are not a split line for 
populations and ethnic groups who often live across different countries. For 
instance, a lot of nomads have been used to migrating all over the continent 
for centuries. It can bring conflicts with farmers simply because official 
borders don’t mean anything for them. 
 
c. Population  
 
Africa is composed of 821 millions inhabitants and more than 1800 ethnic 
groups. The average of density is about 20 inhabitants pro square km. 
except along the coasts and in big cities, the continent is not highly 
populated: 
? the northern and eastern part are more Muslim and looking at the 
Mediterranean and Red sea, 
? the middle of the continent is “black Africa” as we imagine it, and 
settled by black people, 
? the south is more influenced by former European settlement. 
 
The settlements are mostly along the coasts. Most of people are very poor 
with a high death rate, AIDS, malaria and low medical standards. Most of 
them still have a traditional tribal way of life and of thinking. The weight of 
traditional structures is still very important. Moreover, because of wars, 
you can find millions of refugees like in Chad or Sudan for example. 
 
d. Languages 
 
Most of the official languages are inherited from the colonial time 
(Spanish, English, French, Portuguese) but it can be found thousands of 
different dialects according to the ethnic groups. 
 
e. Religions 
 
Northern part, including Sahara, and the eastern part of the continent are 
composed of Muslims. Southern countries are more Christian (except 
southern east coast). In some countries such as Cameroon, Chad Sudan, 
Ivory Coast, both religions try to cohabit. But generally speaking, the gap 
between different religions is widening. There no denying that it is more 
and more and more difficult for those populations to live together. The 
situation is often very tense. Islam is pushing to the south and tries to 
promote fundamentalism. Are we going to a clash of civilisations as 
described by Samuel Huntington? However, those countries will probably 
have to face big issues in the future. 
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Of course, owing to different religion and traditions, the way to behave is 
quite different from one area to another. 
 
f. A continent devastated by conflicts 
 
Dozens of conflicts are observed all over the continent: 
? ethnic wars: Congo, RWANDA, Burundi, 
? religion wars: Sudan, 
? interstates wars: Chad and Sudan, 
? fighting for power: Ivory coast,  
? fighting for a territory: Polisario/Marocco, 
? collapsed, weak states (Liberia, Somalia) 
Generally speaking, states are weak, very poor, and unable to face their 
responsibilities with political personnel just preoccupied to remain in 
power and a high level of corruption. Those conflicts generate millions of 
refugees and the flight of capital investment and intelligentsia. 
 
 
Africa: Changes in progress 
 
a. Political organisations 
 
If you have a look at the number of local and regional organisations, you 
will immediately see how complicated, tricky and then inevitably 
inefficient they are. But the change is now in progress ; in the past, former 
colonial powers used to directly intervene in African issues. Now they just 
want to help African people to help themselves. Africa is evolving and 
getting more organised and structured, in order to enhance its own peace 
and security capability. Interestingly, the African Union took EU as a 
model in order to build its defence and security bodies. That is the reason 
why African Union (AU) was created in July 2002 and a Security and 
peace council (SPC) on the model of the EU one established. The main 
targets of those changes are:  
 
? unity and solidarity between African countries, 
? appropriation of Prevention & security capabilities with regional 
organisations, 
? Defence sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
? Promotion peace, security and stability of the continent, 
? independence of members states, 
? Promotion common positions & continental issues. 
 
AU is a young organisation but it wants to take part in the resolution of the 
big issues the continent has to face. It adopted an Action Plan supported by 
international community which specifies goals to enforce peace in Africa. 
It was agreed to reach in 2010 certain autonomy in crisis management 
matters. Its main and critical initiative has been to decide the creation of 5 
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regional brigades as stand-by forces and peace keeping regional reserve, to 
be a part of an African comprehensive defence and security system. 
But we can’t fail to realise that: 
? AU is still a young organisation,  
? it lacks of financial resources, 
? thus, subsidiarity is very difficult to reach, 
? and there is a big discrepancy between regional organisations. 
Therefore, AU absolutely needs the support of the international 
community. 
 
b. Is EU prepared to match the challenges in Africa? 
 
Only four European countries have an African experience: United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Portugal and France. Therefore, there is all over 
Europe a permanent suspicion and an instinctive reluctance to deal with 
African issues. Following common statements are often heard: 
 
“Only Former colonial powers are responsible for this continent, they have 
to pay for their past” 
“It is far away: it is none of our business” 
Why should we pay and risk the life of our soldiers to sort out colonial 
issues”. 
“In Africa? What to do?” 
 
Many countries have the feeling that they have to pay for the French policy 
in Africa and most of time, public opinions are reluctant to any intervention 
on that continent. But we can’t fail to realise how heavy the challenges to 
face are: poverty, diseases, access to resources, drug, wars, immigration, 
human rights, human trafficking and modern forms of slavery…not so far 
away from home. 
 
c. Africa: a new interest for EU 
 
A. The EU interest for Africa is quite new and has already been 
materialised by AMIS (Sudan), ARTEMIS (Congo) and EUFOR-
RDC (Congo) which is about to deploy. As a matter of fact AU has 
been considered by EU as the good politic frame to promote African 
answers to African issues. The EU current purpose consists in 
reinforcing dialogue and co-operation with AU and supporting the 
build-up of AU capabilities for peace keeping structures. The 
purpose is to help Africans to take their own problems into account, 
to provide them advises, tools and means so that they should be able 
to overcome themselves their continental issues. France supports the 
idea of multilateral a global approach to try to sort out the big issues 
of this continent; you can compare it with a recent past where our 
approach was more bilateral.  
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B. In this context, the support can be provided in a lot of areas: political, 
financial, formation, infrastructure, planning actions, equipment, 
direct logistic support, expertise and so on. The Action plan for 
ESDP (November 2004) in full respect of African ownership 
supports the enhancement of African peace support operations 
capabilities at continental, regional and bilateral levels. It stresses the 
following features: 
 
? conflict prevention and management capacity building, 
? planning support, 
? training, 
? provision of equipment, 
? operational support, 
? ESDP advisory of African-led ops, 
? Ensure coherence and complementarily with bilateral 
initiatives, in full co ordination with other actors in the field: 
UN, AU, RECS, EU, states). 
 
d. EU Tools 
 
RECAMP  
The Action plan for ESDP support to peace & security in Africa has many 
similarities with RECAMP. 
Guidelines and principles are quite the same. It could be really appropriate 
to integrate RECAMP in a broader initiative led by the European Union. 
From the beginning on, RECAMP is an initiative in permanent adaptation, 
in response to an African will, with a multinational, flexible and open-
minded approach:  
 
? since 1997, RECAMP answers The Africans desire to 
progressively ensure the security of their own continent; 
? this initiative fully replies to one of the major concerns of the 
united nations: to reinforce the African peace keeping capabilities; 
? from the beginning on, RECAMP has been a multinational, 
flexible and opening concept to reply to both the political and field 
realities, in the African, European and global context at the same 
time; 
? it is a multinational programme because it is opened to all sub-
Saharan African countries and to all the non African countries, 
wanting to be associated with it; 
? this wish was formalised, among others within NEPAD and had 
the full support of the G8; 
? this initiative is co-ordinated with the British  and American 
initiatives on this continent. 
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The principles of RECAMP initiative are the followings: 
 
? activities of RECAMP are systematically in the general framework 
of international legitimacy with regards to UN charter and 
standards; It favours a multilateral approach, committing the 
international community; 
? open, this approach aims to federate, on a basis of willingness, 
actions led in Africa by states and international organisations, in 
order to develop African  peace keeping capabilities and to involve 
the Regional Economic Communities (RECs); 
? RECAMP is first a prevention tool which aim is to prevent crises 
or limit them as soon as possible in promoting the regional 
integration ; 
? it is also a tool for comprehensive crisis management; 
? therefore its aim is to develop the civil instruments for crisis 
prevention, including domains of public order and security; 
? It favours partnership and involvement with AU in the continental 
security supporting, in the development of African Stand-by Forces 
and focuses on prevention and military HQ structures support. 
 
RECAMP lies on 3 main pillars: 
 
? Co-operation, 
? Training, 
? support of operations. 
 
It lays the emphasis on an internationalised effort towards Africa. 
A. to pursue this goal, we are looking for a better co-ordination and 
complementarity with other initiatives, 
B. wanting to adapt itself to the latest evolutions, RECAMP has 
chosen to support mainly the AU, 
C. RECAMP helps the AU and gives this organisation the priority 
when crisis management is at stake. The RECs are given mission 
by the AU, within the stand-by forces framework, to develop crisis 
management and peace-keeping tools. RECAMP helps them 
therefore in this process, 
D. Another priority of RECAMP is to assist the regional economic 
communities to strengthen their political and strategic military 
levels of decision making. We must admit that the 5 existing RECs 
are not yet equal and we aim at helping them in making their 
command structures more efficient and effective, 
E. Evolution towards a European dimension is the ultimate wish, 
F. Our only ambition is now to make all partners, benefit of 
RECAMP as a tool and a framework under an European union 
lead, taking advantage of the French experience, network and 
skills, 
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G. This means a close partnership with the European Union members 
but with the European Union itself.  
 
The proposition for the partners would be to use the already existing 
RECAMP tools and procedures continuing to develop them or to make 
them evolve if needed. 
 
In respect of instruction, France can take advantage of her historical links 
and her bilateral relationships with some African countries. Many co-
operation actions are led. As for training, France has also a network of 
African national schools with a regional scope run by African countries 
with the support of France and where any African military can join and 
attend courses. About support of operations, France support several African 
battlegroups in peace keeping operations. 
 
We maintain 3 depots in Senegal, Gabon and Djibouti, called RECAMP 
depot, where we store equipment to field a battalion in order to be engaged 
as a peace keeping force. Any other country, of course, could bring some 
kind of equipment in these depots and be a contributor. 
 
A EU operational tool: Battle groups 1.500 
 
In 2004, United Kingdom, Germany and France proposed the EU BG 
concept. The BGs are a tool in support of ESDP. They provide the EU with 
a rapid reaction capacity. 
They are described as “...the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly 
deployable, coherent force package capable of stand alone operations or for 
the initial phase of larger operations…” 
 
The main features of the concept are: 
? 1 500 soldiers deployable within 15 days 
? autonomy from 30 to 120 days (with supply), 
? in the framework of Petersberg tasks are described as following: 
? Assistance to civilians /Humanitarian Aid (HA) 
? Assistance to civilians /Evacuation Operations (EO) 
? Conflict Prevention (CP) 
? Separation Of Parties by Force (SOPF) 
 
The framework for committing the BG refers also to the EU security 
strategy. 
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e. EU operations in Africa 
 
Lets have a look at the principal EU operations in Africa 
 
ARTEMIS  
 
ARTEMIS took place from June to September 2003. It was an Interim 
Emergency Multinational Force within UN resolution (1484) in relief of 
MONUC. It was a EU-led operation (Political control and strategic 
direction by PSC) and the first EU autonomous military operation (without 
any Nato support). 
A. France acted as Framework Nation. It was planned in a very short 
time, then led under hard operation and logistic conditions. About 
1500 personnel were involved including 900 French soldiers. OHQ 
was provided by France (about 80 persons, 40% coming from other 
countries) as the FHQ settled in Entebbe (Uganda). 
 
The Mission was:  
? to contribute to stabilise security conditions and improve 
humanitarian situation, 
? to protect airport & internally displaced persons in camps in Bunia, 
? if situation requires, to contribute to safety of civilian population. 
?  
Among contributing nations, notice the presence of Belgium, United 
Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Poland, Netherlands, Austria, and 
other non EU nations such as: Canada, Brazil, South Africa and Hungary. 
Artemis confirmed the EU capability for rapid reaction needs. It was a 
complete success and was over as planned on September 1st, to be relieved 
by MONUC 2. 
 
DRC:  
 
On the 27th of December 2005, UNO requested the EU to support the 
MONUC in the frame of the elections in DRC, planned for July 2007. The 
force will be composed of 2000 soldiers (800 in Kinshasa et 1 200 in 
Gabon) for a duration of four months. The bulk of forces have been 
provided by France and Germany, reinforced by other Member states such 
as Spain, Poland, Sweden, Austria, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and 
Portugal. The OHQ has been provided by Germany (Potsdam) and the 
FHQ by France. A forward HQ has been deployed in Kinshasa in order to 
make the EU presence visible. The rest of the force (on call force) will 
remain in Gabon (Libreville). But we must not forget that the EU is 
currently leading two other civilian missions in DRC: 
 
? EU POL Kinshasa: reform of the police, EUSEC  
? Kinshasa: SSR reform. 
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SUDAN:  
 
EU in Darfur provides a political support, a human support (observers, 
support of police forces), and a financial and logistical support. As far as 
the logistical support is concerned, we can regret that a lot of EU members 
preferred NATO than EU. In this frame work, FR and GE with 
Luxembourg are the only nations to put their contributions under the EU 
flag, particularly for the relief of AMIS contingents (strategic transport). 
Most of EU members (including France) are reluctant to be more involved 
in Sudan, but we can’t fail to realise that there is currently a humanitarian 
disaster added to a big pressure from the USA. 
 
OPS preparation 
 
Operational capability can be defined as a tactical capability combined with 
a technical, logistical and human capability. 
 
a. General and operational preparation 
 
First of all, it is an absolute necessity for everybody down to the private 
soldier, to have a deep knowledge of the country where he is supposed to 
be engaged, particularly regarding the following features:  
 
? regional context and geopolitics  
? history, conflicts and present situation (origins, history, fighting 
factions, recent developments…)  
? territory (physical characteristics, climate, economy, lines of 
communication.) 
? population/ethnic groups (history, religion, customs) 
? local armed forces 
? mission: risks, threats, operational constraints, limits 
 
The operational preparation is also very important. The mission must be 
studied into details in order to define which tactical expertise will be 
requested. It is primordial to acquire technical and tactical expertise 
through training and of course to train specifically to tough life conditions. 
The equipment preparation includes Medical preparation/ health behaviour. 
Practical life in operation, conditions of living, dangers, must be known by 
heart. In France, the operational preparation lasts 4 months. 
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b. A French Tool: the military school for specialisation in overseas and 
foreign countries 
 
The mission of this particular school is “To inform et train soldiers 
designated to deploy overseas and abroad”. It was created in 2003 to 
develop inter-personal skills and to learn how to behave in operation. The 
purpose of the training course is to facilitate the adaptation to the local 
physical and human environment and thus the accomplishment of the 
mission.  25000 soldiers were trained in 2005. It is now proposed to open 
this school to EU members, in order to allow them to take advantage of this 
particular and overseas-oriented expertise. 
 
 
c. General Behaviour 
 
The 1st month in Africa is essential! 
? the training must be progressive and adapted, 
? it is primordial to discover the country, natives and to try to 
understand them,  
? You will have little time to acquire experience, take advantage of 
each opportunity. 
 
In order to succeed in your mission, observe following advises: 
? be modest and be keen on learning, 
? don’t try to import your European way of thinking, 
? In a word try to adapt to the reality of the country. 
 
How to behave: 
“Bravery and stubbornness of our soldiers will never prevail over the 
knowledge of the field and the customs of natives” (Maréchal Liautey). 
 
This sentence summarises the mains efforts which are to be done: 
? to respect the others, local culture and customs, religion, local 
official and customary laws, official and customary authorities, 
? to be open-minded : understand the local mental schemes, 
? to be curious: try to learn the local way of life and if possible strike 
up contacts with the population (to discuss is very important), 
? to be integrated in the local environment. 
 
On the contrary, avoid to be: 
? arrogant, 
? aggressive, 
? cut from the local reality. 
 
In a word: Don’t be paranoiac, Africa is a wonderful continent with 
wonderful people; you will only find what you will bring! 
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CONCLUSION: 
 
Africa is a very challenging and demanding continent. It will take a long 
time until EU members states consider Africa as a natural operational 
environment But Africa is at the southern border of the EU: every body is 
concerned. 
 
If you are not interested in Africa, sooner or later Africa will take an active 
interest in you. That the reason why it is important to face the challenges 
now. Africa has to face at the same time a lot of difficult challenges: 
poverty, immigration, diseases…Sooner or later it will have an impact on 
EU. 
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Logistics Experiences; the Case of Darfur 
Major Janos Besenyö 
Armed Forces of Hungary 
 
 
I would like to present to you the logistics matters and experiences in the 
mission area of Darfur. Everything that is written in this article is based on 
my personal experience, observations and opinion and does not reflect the 
official position of Hungary or the Hungarian Defence Forces. 
 
When the politicians make an agreement on a case usually the next job is 
for the soldiers (peacekeepers). There are a lot of kinds of jobs, which can 
only be done by soldiers and not by civilians. For this reason, after the 
Peace negotiations when the Parties (African countries, various fighting 
fractions-SLA, JEM, NRMD, UN, EU, NATO and the USA) agreed to 
send peacekeepers to Darfur to stop the violence, they had to act 
immediately. The African Union (AU) decided to send troops as soon as 
possible to the area to secure it. Because the AU as a new organisation 
faced serious financial shortages and lacked some capacities (Logistic, Air 
Ops, IT) the EU, USA and NATO offered the AU help in these areas. 
 
After the Donor Conference all of the organisations decided to send 
observers to help and participate in the AU second peacekeeping mission 
(African Union Mission In Sudan-AMIS) in Africa. The donors started to 
send their aid (money and equipment as well) to the mission area but the 
African troops were not prepared to handle them. Both the shortage of 
military and police forces and the missing positions mostly in the logistics 
field made the situation very difficult on the ground. The African countries 
mostly sent infantry troops without working logistics support system 
(combat support units, etc). Even though the soldiers did a good job as 
infantry units, nobody took care of records keeping or administrative 
handling of the donated equipment. For this reason a lot of things were 
missing or were used in a wrong way. There were shortages of staff 
officers in the logistics and planning sections, which caused Serious and 
various problems with the provision (food, drinking and potable water, bed 
items, sanitation, communication, etc). 
 
The donors sometimes offered complete services or facilities to the AU. 
For example the USA provided the construction of all of the camps through 
the state owned company, PAE. Although PAE made a really good job 
based on the contract between AU and USA, from the AU/AMIS side 
nobody could direct and check them properly because of the missing 
logistics experience. 
 
At the same time the AU officials realised that they overcharged their 
troops on the ground and that they did not have enough capacity to both 
secure the Darfur area and run the mission as well. So for this reason they 
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decided to increase the number of troops and expand the whole mission. In 
the first phase the real strength of the troops were 138 MILOBs (Military 
Observers) and 195 Rwandese and 193 Nigerian Protection Forces (Aug 
2004) 
 
On the second phase the strength of the troops was supposed to be 3320 
people but the AU and the participants could not manage to fill all the 
positions (2774 troops, including CIVPOLs were on the field by the end of 
June 05.). This happened in the enhancement phase as well (AMIS-IIE), 
where the mission was expected to expand to 6171 military personal and 
1560 civilian police by the end of October 05. However they could not fill 
all the positions and the third phase, (AMIS III), planned to have 12300 
personal, was never materialised.  
 
On the AMIS II-E Phase launched 1 July 2005 the donors with the consent 
of the AU officials agreed to offer logistics advisors and expertise besides 
the money, equipment and Airlift to the AU. At this time the EU logistics 
experts were deployed to Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El-Fasher as well. 
Under the same accord new post were approved in the establishment to 
further improve the logistics capacity of AMIS. 
 
The EU, NATO and the USA advisors worked in the ACMC section under 
the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), the highest organisation inside 
AU to co-ordinate the mission in Darfur. You can see its organisation on 
the next chart. 
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Dep J1
Cdr Mate San Roman
(ES)
Dep LogOpsPlans
Maj Veiga
(PT)
Maj Christina 
Gross(CA) 
Joint Chief of Staff
Major General
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Col Mbaye
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(RSA)
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Cdr Ametsipe
(TGO)
J8 
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(Maj)
 
Source: AMIS 2005 
 
Generally the ACMC is the J4 and J8 function within the DITF, working 
directly for the Chief of Staff. The ACMC is responsible for co-ordinating 
all logistics support between the AU, the Donor / Partner nations and 
Contractors in order to provide support to the operational commanders. It 
provides logistics synchronisation support to the movement plan, the force 
generation plan, the infrastructure development plan and the equipment 
delivery programme working in co-ordination with the Logistics Cell at 
Mission HQ in Khartoum and the JLOC in El Fasher. The ACMC co-
ordinates and prioritises the overall sustainment effort for AMIS tasking 
the JLOC through the chain of command as required. 
 
 
Responsibilities:  
 
Chief ACMC. He was responsible to the DITF Joint Chief of Staff for the 
delivery of logistics support and oversight of the theatre logistics effort. 
 
J1/ Personnel. He acted in co-ordination with the existing J1 cell of the 
DITF as the J1 focus and co-ordinating authority for all non-AU personnel 
deployed in support of AMIS. He ensured that Donor personnel deployed 
to theatre in a timely and co-ordinated manner, as agreed and co-ordinated 
with the AU. He provided administrative support to Donor personnel to 
include RSOI, welfare and leave. 
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Log Ops and Plans. He provided logistics planning support to the Chief 
ACMC. Provided real time logistics support to the operation ensuring that 
the military and CIVPOL were properly sustained with C Sups in co-
ordination with PAE. 
 
J4/ Supply. He provided the co-ordination with Donors and contractors for 
the timely delivery of equipment and materiel to the AU, and acted as the 
interface with the JLOC to ensure that the delivery plan to AMIS meets the 
operational requirement and is synchronised with the deployment plan. 
 
JFBMC (Strategic Movement)[1]. He provided Strategic Movement 
support to the DITF and co-ordinates and plans all strategic movement 
between AMIS, AU enhancement nations and the EU and NATO. Acted as 
the forward movement cell for the European Airlift Centre (EAC) at 
Eindhoven and the Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre at SHAPE. 
 
J8/Contracts. She was responsible for all contracting support to AMIS 
working with PAE, Crown Agents and other contractors. 
 
CIVPOL. He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the ACMC ensuring that 
all CIVPOL requirements and enhancement needs are met. Additional 
expertise and advisors worked in the Headquarter to help the work of the 
AU in Sudan (Airlift, etc.) Because Darfur is only a part of Sudan it was 
important to establish an HQ in Khartoum to deal with the Sudanese 
authorities and represent the AU in all AMIS related matters. In Khartoum 
we had a logistics cell as well. You can see their organisation here: 
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 Source: AMIS 2005 
 
Generally this section acted as the logistics transit hub in co-ordination 
with ACMC and the JLOC. Provided diplomatic clearances (Visas and 
Customs clearance), as required, and provided movement and contractual 
support to AMIS. 
 
J1 Personnel. He provided J1 support to AMIS, including provisions of 
visas for all AU personnel, as required, and customs clearance with GOS. It 
was his responsible the delivery of the CASEVAC plan in co-ordination 
with the JLOC. 
 
J4/ Procurement and Supply. He acted as the focus for Procurement and 
Supply in co-ordination with ACMC. 
 
J4/ Movement. He assisted with movement of personnel and equipment, 
including tactical airlift moving through Khartoum. 
The Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC) was deployed in El-Fasher 
(the capital of Darfur) The JLOC organised and directed the logistics 
system in the mission area and did the real work on the field. 
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Generally the JLOC acted as the logistics focus within the FHQ for both 
the Military and Police missions. It prepared operational logistics plans in 
support of the operation and acted as the operational level logistics 
authority. The JLOC ensured that the operational theatre is properly 
sustained. The JLOC worked in direct co-ordination with the Logistics Cell 
at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the ACMC in Addis Ababa. 
 
Chief JLOC. The Chief JLOC was responsible for the delivery of logistics 
support to AMIS within the operational theatre. He worked through the 
Deputy Head of Mission and operated on behalf of both the Force 
Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner. 
 
Deputy Chief JLOC. He acted on behalf of the Chief JLOC and is the 
JLOC Chief of Staff, co-ordinating all operational logistics staff effort. 
Field Support Section (FSS). The FSS provided the direct logistics 
contact with Sectors on behalf of Chief JLOC and worked in co-ordination 
with the functional cells. The FSS was responsible for the delivery of up to 
date logistics reports and returns from Sectors to the Chief JLOC. 
 47
He was responsible in the mission area (with close relation with PAE and 
its subcontractors) for the food-catering service, camp management, water 
supply, environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for 
other orders from Chief JLOC. 
 
Log Ops and Plans. He provided logistics planning support to the Force 
Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner. Provided real time logistics 
support to the operation ensuring that the military and CIVPOL are 
properly sustained with C Sups in co-ordination with PAE. 
 
Maintenance. He ensured that all vehicles in theatre are properly 
maintained and supported in co-ordination with Contractors. 
 
Materiel Management. He ensured that all equipment is properly 
distributed and managed to support the needs of the operation and all 
equipment is properly accounted for. 
 
Movement / Air Ops. He co-ordinated all in-theatre J4 movement 
including tactical airlift, SH, (when in a J4 function) and road convoys. 
 
Medical / Environmental Health. He co-ordinated medical and health 
service support to include treatment and evacuation of casualties, medical 
logistics, preventative medicine and environmental health with PAE and 
other medical providers. This position was not filled eighter by EU or AU 
at this time, for this reason everybody from JLOC dealt with these matters. 
 
Communications / IT. He co-ordinated the distribution and maintenance 
of all communications and IT equipment in accordance with the 
communications plan.  
 
CIVPOL. He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the JLOC ensuring that all 
CIVPOL requirements and enhancement needs are met. EU did not man 
this position under my service time. 
 
The first EU advisors arrived in the theatre on 29 June from the United 
Kingdom, Spain and Hungary. We spent our first weeks in Addis Ababa 
because we did not get our visas in time, so we occupied ourselves in Addis 
to help in the DITF. After we received our visas we first went to Khartoum 
and then to Darfur. When we arrived there we got temporary 
accommodation only for a time, because the camp was overcrowded. 
Nearly all the European experts had worked and lived in Africa before 
(myself in Western Sahara-MINURSO) but we were not prepared for the 
amount of difficulties that we had found there. 
 
We needed a few days to accommodate ourselves and to get our job started. 
Unfortunately we did not have offices. The JLOC existed only on paper 
and not in real life. We could not find our African counterparts who we had 
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to co-operate with. For this reason the Force Commander decided that we 
have to work in the FHQ logistics section and take part in the replacement 
and development of AMIS II-E. Despite that we were not under the Force 
Commander’s command we begun to work with the FHQ Logistics cell and 
were faced with more problems. 
 
No matter how hard the PAE and its subcontractor worked to construct new 
camps and to expand the existing facilities they were already late because 
of the rainy season (in this time the only way to transport material was by 
helicopter). We had to support the troops on the ground and organise the 
Airlift in close co-operation with AU, EU, NATO and the USA. We also 
had to provide accommodation, food, water and others for the newcomers. 
 
 
The next chart shows the AMIS II-E deployment schedule: 
 
Battalions Deploymen
Dates 
Number 
Pax 
Estimated 
Freight 
(Tons) 
Est Ammo
(Tons) 
Preferred 
APOE 
Preferred 
APOD 
Airlift Donor 
Nation 
Nigerian Bn 1 
Sector 2 
1 – 14 Jul 680 40 18 Kaduna Nyala GER 
UE 
Rwandan Bn 1
Sector 1 
15 – 29 Jul680 32 16 Kigali Nyala US 
NATO 
Rwandan Bn 2
Sector 7 
30 Jul –  
9 Aug 
538 32 16 Kigali El Fasher US 
NATO 
Gambian Coy 
Force HHQ 
30 Jul –  
9 Aug 
196 12 7 Banjul* El Fasher ? 
Nigerian Bn 2 
Sector 8 
10 –  
18 Aug 
876 
(note 3) 
40 18 Abuja* Nyala UK 
NATO 
Senegalese B
Sector 5 
20 –  
29 Aug 
538 32 16 Dakar El Fasher France 
UE 
Nigerian Bn 3 
Sector 3 
1 –  
9 Sep 
484 
(note 3) 
40 18 Abuja* El Fasher UK 
NATO 
Rwandan Bn 3
Sector 4 
30 Sept –  
6 Oct 
538 40 18 Kigali El Fasher ? 
South African
Bn 
 22 – 
Sector 6 
25 Oct 
550 
(Note 4) 
32 16 Bloemfontein
or 
Pretoria 
El Fasher Netherlands 
NATO 
South African
Eng Coy, EO
 
D
team Reserve 
Coy 
28 –  
29 Sep 
210 12 (Note 2) Bloemfontein
or 
Pretoria 
El Fasher Netherlands 
NATO 
Kenyan MP  
Sector 1 
30 Sep 25 2 - Nairobi El Fasher ? 
 
Source: AMIS 2005 
 
Of course this schedule had changed because of the circumstances 
(weather, readiness of camps, etc) and and it wasn’t until October that we 
could carry out the enlargement of AMIS. 
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During this period all of the JLOC positions (except the CIVPOL and the 
Medical Environmental Health) were filled by the donor countries (Spain, 
France, United Kingdom, Sweden, Danmark, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, USA 
and Canada) but the AU didn’t fill the logistics positions in JLOC until by 
the end of October. Until then we worked alone with all responsibility. 
When we received our partners it was clear that except some of them they 
do not have any logistics background (graduation in logistics school or 
field experience). This made our job more difficult. 
 
The other problem was that none of the African units (except the South 
Africans) arrived with full capacity units. In the battalions Combat Support 
Units (Sector Support Cell), only on existed on paper. These units consisted 
of infantry troops only without any logistics support element. Only the 
South African contingent was totally equipped to comply with the 
requirements of a fully capable battalion in the mission area. They had their 
own logistics platoon and a lot of officers who had logistics qualification 
and experience. 
 
With the lack of logistics skills, everybody expected full support from the 
civilian contractor (PAE). However there is a new trend in peacekeeping 
or/and other operations that civilian companies perform a lot of the tasks, 
for which the military does not want to waste soldiers or they do not have 
the necessary qualification for (Logistic, Air Ops, IT, Communication, 
cleaning and construction jobs). The military component has to plan the 
mission needs, order the service and properly check the contractors before 
payment. For this reason it is very important that the J4 (logistic) section is 
manned with qualified and capable officers, who can deal with the civilian 
companies in all matters and on all levels. In Darfur this did not work 
properly and the mission leaders did not know exactly what was in the 
contracts, therefore they expected sometimes more service from the 
contractor, than what the AU and the USA government had agreed on 
previously. One of our first tasks was to read trough the contracts in order 
to finalize what the civilian companies have to do and what is our (AMIS) 
right and obligation. We also had to create a working system together with 
sectors and the civilian companies (reports, registrations, etc). After that all 
of us begun working on this task. I was responsible for the Field Support 
Service, this means catering, camp management, water supply, 
environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for other 
orders from Chief JLOC. The mission area was the size of France and in 
the 8 sectors there were 33 camps located. 
 
What made our task more difficult was that during this time (from June till 
the end of 2005) the security situation was relatively calm but 
unpredictable. The banditry attacks, stealing of livestock, harassment of the 
civil populace by armed militias were taking place nearly every week. 
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The fighting renewed in the general areas (Jebel Marra, Amu valley, 
Muhjeria, etc.) between Sudanese Armed Forces, Janjaweed militias and 
SLA and JEM. The armed Arabic militias attacked villages (Tawila, 
Mukjar, etc) and IDPs camps as well. The rebels attacked GOS and 
Humanitarian convoys as well and there were some clashes between SLA 
and JEM. Violent threats against AMIS, UN and NGOs (Non 
Governmental Organisations) have increased so the situation started to 
become more problematic. I believe that sometimes the fighting fractions 
agreed that AMIS could be a common target. It happened that between 
Khor Abechi and Menawashi an unknown fighting fraction attacked PAE 
trucks, where they killed the civilian drivers and not much later another 5 
Nigerian soldiers, who arrived to relive the convoy. In another case an 
other group attacked a patrol in Sector 5, where they took over all the 
equipment from the soldiers and released them without combat boots, so 
they had to walk back to the camp on bare foot. A lot of times they shot at 
AMIS helicopters convoys and camps. On 24 December 2005 one 
helicopter was shot down killing everybody on board. The Sudanese Army 
was not much better either. They painted their attack helicopters and 
military vehicles white and attacked the SLA and JEM positions with them. 
Of course after a time the fighters did not make any difference between 
GOS and AMIS white cars. From time to time the Sudanese Army 
organised us a quite nice military parade around the FHQ, which frustrated 
our soldiers. When we received the first Canadian APCs (Armoured 
Personal Carriers) the Sudanese authorities sent us an official warning 
letter stating that they will not tolerate any of them ending up in the hands 
of SLA or JEM. After this letter they organised a tour with soldiers, tanks 
and various military equipment (from the early1960s till today, mostly 
Russian equipment). The soldiers were yelling, crying and shouting with 
weapons around the camp, I think they tried to show us who has the real 
power in Sudan. During my tour I could witness two of this kind of parades 
in El-Fasher. 
 
The Humanitarian situation in the IDP camps were becoming over 
congested, the camp facilities were overstretched. However the 
Humanitarian Agencies had continued to provide life-saving Humanitarian 
assistance to IDPs as well residents in the villages, but some of them 
evacuated their aid workers because the banditries and attacks against the 
Humanitarian convoys and workers. 
 
Although the situation was unpredictable the presence of Humanitarian 
agencies, AMIS MILOBs, CIVPOLs and foreign observers helped in 
stemming the tide of hostilities. 
 
In this situation the AMIS/CFC (Cease Fire Committee) had continued to 
intensify its activities to reduce the incidence of cease-fire violations in 
Darfur. In accordance with its mandate, as contained in article 4 of HCFA 
(8 April 2004 AMIS) they continuously investigated allegations in response 
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to reports of cease-fire violations (Baraka, Graida, Kalma, etc). The regular 
patrols were conducted by MILOBs to promote confidence building and 
also to show AU presence on the ground. Unfortunately after some 
shooting incident against AU personnel or in difficult situations (for 
example when the SLA and GOS fought for Sheria city) the leaders of 
AMIS gave orders to delay patrols in order to save our soldiers. These 
orders were only temporary and after that we begun to conduct the patrols 
again. The mission leaders and the CFC embarked on consultations with all 
parties in the conflict and the Humanitarian Agencies and attended the Joint 
commission meeting once a month at N’djamena, Chad. This was the real 
situation in AMIS-IIE phase. 
 
By the end of October we had 3 infantry battalions from Nigeria, 3 infantry 
battalions from Rwanda, 1 infantry battalion from Senegal, 1 infantry 
company from Gambia (as a reserve unit in FHQ), 1 Military Police Unit 
from Kenya and 1 infantry company, 1 engineer platoon and a EOD section 
from South Africa.  
 
In the same time we had Military Observers, Civilian Police members, the 
contractor workers (PAE-USA and Skylink-Canada) and their 
subcontractors (Amzar-Food, catering service, MSS-medical and Hygienic 
service, etc.) and other local workers (building and cleaning camps, etc) 
who did not all live in the camps but they used our facilities as well. This 
caused new challenges to our overloaded camp systems. The strength of 
AMIS developed quickly and when I left it was as follows: 
 
Military all ranks: 5611 
 
CIVPOL:  1195 
PAE:   229 
AMZAR:  418 
Skylink:  139 
Total:  7589 
 
As the Deputy of Field Support Service I had to work in close relationship 
with my African counterpart and the contractors on the below listed topics: 
 
Food-catering service:  
 
? To monitor PAE and AMZAR on the field, so they are adhering to 
the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. 
? To organise the food delivery to the remote camps with AirOps in 
close co-operation with AMZAR & PAE. 
? To co-ordinate with the PAE Food & Facilities Manager any 
problems regarding the AU 
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? To advise AMZAR in catering, training for cooks (for example I 
wrote a kitchen guidelines to help ths cooks work, etc.). 
? To co-operate with another sections (Ops and Plans, Logistics, Mess 
commitee, etc.) 
? Delegations, guests 
 
Camp management: 
 
? To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and 
SOPs, as set out by the AU. 
? To run the camp catering, liaise with the Catering Contractor on a 
daily basis. 
? To supervise all Facilities including but not limited to Laundry, 
Dining Rooms, Accommodation, Camp Maintenance & Equipment 
Security. 
 
Water supply: 
 
? To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and 
SOPs, as set out by the AU. 
? Close co-operation with PAE water manager to provide drinkable and 
potable water to the whole mission area 
? Regular quality control of the water 
 
Environmental, Health and Camp sanitation: 
 
? To monitor PAE and MSS on the field, so they are adhering to the 
contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. 
? Close co-operation with PAE camp sanitation manager and MSS 
operational manager 
? Health & Hygiene Management within the Camp Facilities, to 
include waste management (Fuel spillage, waste disposal, sewage). 
stress management (entertainment) 
 
Fire Marshall: 
 
? To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and 
SOPs, as set out by the AU. 
? Develop and check the Fire evacuation plans 
? To organise fire extinguiser delivery and replacement to the remote 
camps with AirOps in close co-operation with PAE. 
? To co-ordinate with the PAE Operational Manager any problems 
regarding the AU (cooking inside the tents, etc.). 
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The main challenges, problems that we faced: 
 
The circumstances were quite difficult and we were faced with some 
challenges. Because of the time shortage we only got one day of training in 
Brussels to prepare ourselves for this mission. I think later in other 
operations at least 2-3 day preparation courses need to be organised so that 
those participating in the operation get to know each other better can and 
make more detailed preparations. 
 
The AU was not prepared to handle the EU-NATO-USA advisors in a right 
way (“white face problem”). We faced a lot of uncomfortable situations 
when African officers told us that we are colonialist or the spy of western 
countries. It happened that an African politician questioned the content of 
our reports from Darfur. He told us that our report did not reflect the real 
and true situation on the field and he sent us various e-mails, in which he 
stated our limited capacity to help the AU mission in Sudan. As a 
Hungarian I felt really bad because Hungary never-ever occupied any 
colonies in Africa and we do not have any economic or other interest there. 
We came to Africa to help and left behind us our families, jobs and risked 
our life and personal safety. No one of us from the JLOC received any 
salary or any goods from AU; we were paid by EU and our own countries. 
Fortunately this was not a very usual situation because most of our 
colleagues were helpful and from the AU officials we got all the support 
that we needed. However we learned that the Africans are very sensitive 
and to give them advice and help can sometimes be difficult. 
 
The operational environment was quite basic, no EU standard (camp 
sanitation, personal hygiene, accommodation, food, etc.) As I mentioned 
previously when we arrived to Darfur, it was the enhancement time and 
most of the camps were overcrowded and that caused problems. 
 
The different cultural conventions and different nationals, religious practice 
and possible oversensitivity (to work in a Muslim environment as a 
Christian) and a different approach to responsibilities and rights in the 
Mission (rank, position, qualification, etc.) caused difficulties. 
 
Life/work in an unknown environment was challenging. The place was 
unknown not only for us but also for some African officers and soldiers. 
We had to learn to respect and understand the locals and co-operate with 
them. 
 
No JOC only JLOC worked in the mission. When the JLOC was created 
we saw that there were some misunderstandings between the military and 
civilian components and this caused unnecessary difficulties in the 
everyday life. The JLOC begun to harmonise between the components to 
clarify their logistics needs and give them advice and help to fulfil their 
tasks. We faced other problems as well, which we could not solve alone so 
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for this reason we suggested to create JOC (Joint Operation Center) to 
harmonise the work of all parts of AMIS (CFC, military, police and civilian 
parts). I do not know why but some high ranking officers rejected this idea 
and in 2005 this organisation existed only in our dreams. 
 
No real responsibility (missing positions such as camp commandants, 
logistic, hygiene and fire officers). As I mentioned before we had to take 
more responsibility in the work with civilian companies/contractors. For 
example, I suggested that we have to appoint in each camp logistics 
officers, camp commandants (a kind of quartermaster, who is dealing with 
the camp order and organise everything that is related to the camp), 
hygiene and fire officers, who had to work in close relationship with PAE 
camp managers (their responsibilities were to run the camps) and with the 
MSS doctors. Military people do not like it when a civilian tries to give 
them orders (how they have to clean their tents, behave in the camps etc.) 
for this reason it was important that the Army part of this mission, was not 
to be only a customer who order services from the civilians but a 
participant who takes his own responsibility to run the mission. When I left 
only in El-Fasher we had an appointed camp commander and his work 
proved that when the military and police forces took more responsibility 
and worked with the contractors, everything went more smoothly than 
before. 
 
Slow decision-making. Lack of information, problems with 
communications and other short falls made it difficult to decide in time and 
act as rapidly as is necessary in a military operation. 
 
No daily LOGSITREPS from sectors to FHQ. Some camps did not have 
radios, laptops or computers and if they sent any reports they wrote them 
by hand. Most of the camps did not send any daily logistics reports as we 
did in UN or NATO missions therefore we did not get correct information 
of their needs. The sector logistics officers (who were mostly infantry, 
artillery or other specialities) without this information could report only 
their request to us. For this reason they got more logistical help than the 
camps. When we arrived in any camp the problems came out immediately 
(we do not have cars, spare tires, communication equipment, cameras, 
computers, no enough food, etc) and we were surprised because nobody 
reported their real situation. If we want to run a military or peacekeeping 
operation smoothly it is very important to receive real information from the 
field and act immediately to fulfil the logistics needs. 
 
No proper planning. It means logistically not in operations. For example it 
caused a lot of problems when AU officials planned their fuel needs 
(helicopters, cars, etc) because they planned for 12 days but the amount 
fuel that they calculated was enough only for 8 days. So AU could save 
approximately 1million USD because Canada donated the helicopters and 
the flight hours. For this reason in the rainy season we could not send 
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enough food to the camps to feed our soldiers. One soldier was supposed to 
get 15 kg food/week (including the wrapping materials) so we needed for 
the whole mission 120 tons of food a week. When I arrived we received 35-
45 % of the necessary amount of ingredients and when I left 76%, but we 
never received the full amount. This happened because we did not get 
enough fuel and for other reasons as well. A lot of times the PAE used its 
own helicopters to supply African troops on the ground because the AMIS 
helicopters could not fly in lack of kerosene. As I know we were never paid 
for the extra work and the used fuel, flight hours to PAE. This is only one 
of the problems that we faced because of the improper planning. 
 
Lack of Human resources or using them in a wrong way, in a wrong 
position. For example, when the positions in JLOC were filled by AU, we 
did not have enough African officers who graduated from Logistics school 
or had logistics experience. We requested an officer from FHQ who has 15 
years experience in the transportation field but we could not get her, 
because she was the only one who could make PowerPoint presentations in 
her section. For this reason they did not release her and we got another 
officer who did not know too much about transportation matters and he had 
to learn. Fortunately all officers who got positions in JLOC wanted to do a 
good job and this made our job easier. 
 
Lack of communication between sections or components and rivalry. First 
we did not have enough communication equipment and the donors did not 
give the same type of systems. This is a technical thing, which we could 
solve with professional communication and IT personnel and harmonise the 
systems to work. But we never had enough specialists for this job. Another 
problem was that there were clashes between the military and police 
components in the JLOC as well (rights, responsibilities, etc.). It took extra 
time and efforts to solve these situations 
 
 
Suggestions for AMIS mission in Sudan: 
 
? EU has to clarify the role and position of the non-African advisors; 
? EU should make clear that we are in Sudan (Africa as well) to help 
and not impose the western will; 
? Create JOC as soon as possible; 
? Proper planning and training; 
? Create and use LOGSITREPs; 
? Enlarge the storage facilities (MRE, fresh and frozen food); 
? Giving priority to food and Medevac (No VIPs or medals); 
? Appoint camp commandants, hygiene officers and fire marshals in 
each camps as soon as possible; 
? Donors have to continue to put pressure on AU to handle properly 
the donated equipment (missing first aid kits, car accidents, using 
laptops, computers, etc.). 
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Possible future for EU in Africa: 
 
? Bringing some of our experience as advisors; 
? Take part in the training and build of a working training system 
(Communications, IT, Logistics and AirOps) 
? We can expect growing ethnical and religious problems in Africa 
and more hot place but it is not a good idea to send any European 
troops there, only military and police advisors and trainers 
(historical reasons, sensitiveness); 
? Establish a planning process in the EU to be able to provide 
support to other organisations (AU) in crisis management 
operations and to provide short and long term support; 
? It can be a long term support to have staff or liaison officers at AU 
HQ in Addis Ababa to support the AU with long term crises 
management (mostly in logistics and contract issues); 
? Take part in the rebuilding process and help to develop the local 
economy 
 
I think the EU advisors did a useful job in AMIS and if we use the 
experience what we got in Sudan we can prepare ourselves to do a better 
job in the next missions in Africa (Somalia, etc) and develop a real 
partnership with the African countries to solve the problems of the 
continent. 
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Dynamics of Peace and Security in Africa 
H.E. Funmilayo A. Adebo-Kiencke 
Ambassador of Nigeria to Finland 
 
Introduction 
 
In this session, we are to concern ourselves with the dynamics of peace and 
security through answers to two questions: Q.1.What are the main causes or 
underlying factors of security problems on the African continent, and Q.2. 
what would be the appropriate relationship between the European Union 
and African states or institutions in resolving these problems? 
 
Although Africa is a continent three times the size of Europe, with peoples 
more diverse than in Europe, I believe that the answer to the first question 
does not differ for each country very much. 
 
The Stanley Foundation in 1996 stated that “security” should no longer be 
defined in terms of military strength and action, but that having security 
incorporates, “political stability, healthy economy and environment and 
respect for human rights”. 
 
The cause and underlying factors of the lack of security as defined above in 
countries of Africa do not have their origins as one would think, in 
something specific to the make-up of the people of Africa. Every society 
have some members who feel the need to attack a government or country, 
not necessarily their own, which they perceive to have failed them, or all or 
parts of its citizens, and against which a war of words or action is therefore 
to be waged. We should direct our minds to the Bader Meinhof group, and 
other terrorist groups or persons in Europe and in the US. One mistake 
often made is to see and judge African countries and its peoples in a 
different light than Europeans, yet there really is no difference. The 
difference is perceived, as to give reasons to lower the level of Africans to 
Europeans. An African brought up in a European environment will be 
basically no different, so it is the environment that matters. 
 
Causes or underlying factors of contemporary security problems in 
Africa 
 
African countries are bound to lack peace and security, for they have 
neither military strength, nor economic or stable political and social 
environment. It is evident that too many countries in Africa are yet to 
determine which form of government is most suitable for the country, with 
groups antagonistic to one another, and an ever-increasing population. 
Economic policies become secondary. 
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Interference by other countries in the governance of many African 
countries with the excuse of establishing Democracy causes insecurity and 
prevents the build-up of strong institutions of government and governance 
suitable for each country. Proffering advice differs from interference or 
divisive acts, for as President Halonen said, no country can survive alone, 
so countries depend on each other however minimal the need. 
 
The population of African countries lack education and training, as to know 
their rights or even to understand their own needs, and are unable to accept 
responsibility for the obligations expected of them by their society. 
Confucius said that an enlighten citizenry will permit good governance. 
African ministers back the UN Decade of Education for sustainable 
development, which as the Director General, Mr. Koichiro Matsuurs said, 
“to integrate the values inherent in sustainable development into all aspects 
of learning, and to encourage changes in behaviour that allow for a more 
sustainable and juste society”. In an immature society, as in most countries 
of Africa, the political stability needed to provide security cannot be 
equated with western form of Democracy and Governance. That 
Democracy is the best form of governance is however not disputed. 
 
Africa boasts of ancient civilisations that contributed to world 
development, yet Africans are not acknowledged as able to manage their 
own lives. The governments of a many countries of the Middle East and 
Asia, not more democratic than African countries, are acceptable by those 
countries that condemn African countries. 
 
The fact that a group of persons are voted into power does not guarantee 
democracy, nor the active involvement of the people in governance. In 
some western countries, the same party is in power for several years, and 
sometimes the same people. Power becomes concentrated and individual 
rights are unequal between rich and the poor. What immediate difference is 
such governance, to a government that comes to power, not through a 
ballot, but which guarantees the needs of the people, freedom and justice, 
not forgetting possible assumption of power by the rigging of ballots, in an 
election. If a country is peaceful, why incite satisfied citizens by criticising 
the government as undemocratic? Most countries did not begin with 
democracy, and eventually developed into democracy. The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute in its last report states, “some feel 
that a period of benevolent autocracy from external actors offers the best 
chance for successful peace-building”. Why not, benevolent autocracy of 
internal actors, whose country it is, for the best chance. Only they are 
intitled. 
 
The reasons for lack of peace and security, or how to receive it are old and 
contemporary, and not different from country to country, if we look back 
into history. Which country did not have a turbulent past? There is nothing 
African that prevents developments, and lack of peace and security, not 
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forgetting that this word “African” is being used to refer to peoples from 
many countries, sometimes more different to each other, than a comparison 
of the differences between the peoples of Scandinavia to one another or 
with countries in Europe. The consequences of slave trade, colonialism and 
global manipulations have contributed to the level of development in 
Africa. 
 
The Indians of America, African Americans, the Aborigines of Australia, 
the Bantus of South Africa, the Vikings, the Samis and all other natives of 
countries known to us, all have had a past with lack of peace and security, 
and some still do not have it today, because of the same reasons as before, 
subjugation and control of their lives and dreams by others and yet the 
governments of the day were regarded as democratic. 
 
Influence of colonialism/neo colonialism 
 
Inspite of the fact that African countries took over the governance of each 
of their countries, dependency has been made to continue, through control 
of trade, technology and the possession of military strength by super 
powers of the world, neo-colonialism. 
 
In spite of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, specialists 
and consultants of one form or another, from the so-called developed 
nations, the nations in Africa continue to lack sustainable development, and 
therefore also lack peace and security. 
 
Colonialism and the lack of infrastructures, unity and development during 
the colonial era, are definitely contributory factors to recent insecurity in 
African countries. In the report of the British Colonial Office in August – 
September 1948, Rt. Honourable Arthur Jones, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies said, “Our conception of African development is based on 
western political philosophy, and as far as we can see at present, that of the 
African Leaders is based on the same ideas”. If that were the case, why 
were the countries of Africa left undeveloped? – What happened was 
control of their aspirations, and restriction of shearing of world power and 
resources. It is still today the reason for international trade and political 
manoeuvrings unfavourable to Africa. 
 
Education was kept to a minimum in the colonial era, and infrastructures 
were inadequate for social and economic development. It is acknowledged 
that, “Unsatisfied appetites in an ignorant and illiterate population make it 
an easy prey to subversive propaganda of all kinds”. 
The issue of insurgency in many regions, due to ethnic or border disputes is 
caused, as was said, by “the fact that the division of Africa was carried out 
with little regard to ethnic consideration”, and that “territorial boundaries 
cut across ethic boundaries in many places, not only in the division of the 
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continent into countries, but also in the division of some countries into 
local government areas”. Where tribes are split, it was said, “it is natural 
that there would be a dissatisfaction and hence conflict” e.g. Somalia, 
Rwanda, Morocco, Western Sahara etc. The writer suggested that in some 
cases there should be a revision of some frontiers, but only through 
consultation and agreement with the African countries involved. We must 
also remember dispossession by whites of African land in S. Africa and 
Zimbabwe particularly but also Kenya and other places. No compensation 
was ever paid, unlike for the Jews, and Germans after the 2nd world war, 
when German citizens from East Germany who lost their lands received 
compensation. Some even could reclaim it after the unification. To 
redistribute land and determination of their borders, The AU could be 
supported in such a project if tabled, and maybe, it should be tabled 
formally at the UN considering the situation in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Chad, Marocco and Western Sahara. Redistribution of land in Africa and 
accessibility to development by those previously marginalized must be an 
issue to be considered globally, and at the UN. Others not Africans have 
always been compensated. 
 
The role of the United Nations 
 
The collaboration of the EU with the African states and institutions to 
ensure the proper execution of the UN Charter by giving support to the UN 
and strengthening the organisation would bring about the desired 
resolutions of some of these problems. 
 
Strict adherence to the provision of Article I of the Charter of the United 
Nations, particularly the provision that, “armed force shall not be used, 
save in the common interest” and the employment of international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all 
nations, will contribute to peace and security, the world over, as less 
developed countries will develop and will feel safe. 
 
The Rockefeller panel report on U.S Foreign Policy in 1959 stated, “The 
UN stands, finally as symbol of the world order that will be built. Does the 
moral obligation backed by law in the UN Charter still command 
acceptance? To measure the UN´s contribution, one need only ask how 
much meaner and poorer, how much less touched by hope or reason, would 
be the world scene if it suddenly ceased to exist”. The UN acting in concert 
can assure the success of African development agenda, politically, 
economically and socially. 
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The Role of the EU 
 
The EU itself should be, as Sir Winston Churchill stated in a speech to the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, “one of several continental 
units which will form the pillars of the world instrument, (that is the UN) 
for maintaining security and be the best guarantee of maintaining peace”. 
 
The EU can achieve much if the countries of the EU are convinced of the 
moral and legal justification to act more strongly. Credit must be given to 
the EU for all the assistance rendered to Africa so far, but much more is 
required for peace and security through development. 
 
President Halonen stated in her inauguration speech that security and well 
being is achieved through development. A start would be laws that ensure 
transparency and anti corruption in trade, and in development aid giving. 
The priority at all times on aid should however be determined together with 
the government of the African countries. 
 
Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ban on small arms and light 
weapons 
 
The EU has the power to ensure that the treaty on non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is strictly adhered to. There must be disarmament, which 
is no longer talked about since the end of the cold war, or shall we say 
since the collapse of the former Soviet Union! 
 
Action is taken on nuclear arms freeze, when a country that does not 
previously possess the technology decides to start nuclear development. 
Yet, even Dr Hans Blix had once stated that nuclear technology for 
peaceful means should be available to all states. Unless all the countries 
who are members of the UN again renew the policy of disarmament, and 
assure those countries that do not have military might of non-interference 
in their internal affairs, other countries will aim to acquire nuclear 
technology and not only for peaceful means, especially when their 
territorial integrity is threatened or those of others have been violated. 
 
My thoughts now go to suppliers of weapons used in these conflicts. 
Weapons export is the main trade for many countries. Non-export of 
weapons to countries with human rights abuse, and a ban on small arms 
and light weapons should be adhered to, worldwide. Disarmament should 
not be subordinated to trade. 
 
In continuation of this thought, the needs of the so called developed nations 
for the resources of the so called developing nations could become, if it is 
not already, a major cause of lack of peace and security, since such 
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interests influence the relationship with the countries having those natural 
resources. 
 
Dissidents may receive support for guaranteeing access to resources. A 
stable government may receive no support if it does not follow the biddings 
of a strong and influential so called developed country, where natural 
resources are in issue. 
 
The requirements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 
should be adhered to and extended to small arms and light weapons 
(SLAW). The AU has advocated for a banning of the sale of small arms 
and light weapons to dissidents in African States, and for Africa to be a 
nuclear weapon free zone, but will such be agreed to, and respected? 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. The EU should strengthen the capacity of AU and regional 
organisations for capacity building, and help to strengthen the African 
Union peace-keeping operations. 
 
2. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) has become 
the credible platform for articulating, formulating and implementing the 
developmental agenda of the continent. It is also the platform for 
collaborative engagement with African development partners across the 
globe. 
 
3. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of NEPAD provides the 
forum for self-assessment by acceding African leaders. The processes of 
peer reviewing in many countries are at various levels of review. The 
essence is to enthrone good governance in all sectors of the national 
lives of the African peoples. 
 
4. The discussion of AU and its actions should not be overlooked as 
unimportant, nor should the AU be seen as an unequal player in World 
Order. Africa is AU. It is the undermining of African countries and its 
people, sometimes by derogatory references, “the Blacks”, “the 
African” (to refer to everyone from different countries in Africa) in 
context where individuals of one country in Africa is meant, that has 
now brought a new dimension into the relationship with African 
countries. Stressing the existence of different religions as divisive, when 
it may be unimportant is damaging. Religion does not on its own 
influence governance detrimentally. From time immemorial it has 
always been used, to cause divisions for political and economic 
advantage. 
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5. On the International Scene, the Security Council should be made more 
representatives for the nations of the world and African countries should 
be represented wherever decisions affecting African countries are to be 
made. African countries should not be condescended, to even if not 
equal and the AU is not in competition with the EU or the UN in its 
activities. The AU, as the EU in its relationship with the UN, is a 
collaborator for peace and security, albeit only in Africa. The AU is not 
an individual country, but a representative of all African countries and 
should be treated as such. 
 
As President Halonen said “A more just world is a safer world, and also a 
better place for us to live in”. This view is shared by many including 
myself, as the key to peace and security. 
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Dynamics of Peace and Security in Africa 
H.E. Dr. Hanns Schumacher 
Ambassador of Germany to Finland 
 
 
In 1960, a first major UN peace keeping mission in what was then called 
Congo succeeded in its goals of reuniting a fractious country and an at that 
time unknown, US-backed candidate named General Joseph Mobutu, 
eventually won power. Who would have thought that more than four 
decades later the UN has returned to the same country, which only changed 
its name to Democratic Republic of Congo? The underlying problems of 
poverty, mines, ethnical hatred, warlords and war chests have not changed. 
 
UN peace keeping in Africa has become full circle! This alone should be 
dire warning enough to come to easy conclusions and in particular to quick 
and mostly one-sided recriminations of who or what is to be made 
responsible for the contemporary security problems on the African 
Continent. 
 
Yes, I agree: the colonial past remains a heavy burden. Many of the African 
frontiers are simple geometric lines, taking little or no account of African 
societies that exist on the ground. European colonial powers assembled 
territories, merging hundreds of diverse and independent groups, with no 
common history, culture, language or religion. 
 
But then: the undisputed recognition and acceptance of all existing 
boundaries in Africa was (and still is) the iron principle on which the 
existence of the African Union and her predecessor, the OAU has been 
based. No war in Africa was ever fought over territory or boundaries – with 
the exception of the most senseless one between the two poorest countries 
in the UNDP Human Development Index, Ethiopia and Eritrea, over a 
meaningless provincial dust-bowl named Badme, a place which can be 
hardly found on the maps. 
 
Yes, I agree: the major donor countries have poorly failed their frequent 
promises and even commitments to provide at least 0,7 % of their GNP’s 
for international development needs and are still not inclined to amend their 
trade and agricultural policies for the sake of Africa’s revival. The total 
value of EU and American agricultural subsidies amounts to roughly one 
billion Dollars a day. The EU’s subsidy for each of its cows is about 800 
Euros a year – more than the average African income.  
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But then: since the decolonization process begun, Africa has received far 
more foreign aid than any other region in the world. More than 600 Billion 
of Western aid has been sunk into sub Sahara Africa, with little discernible 
result! Only four figures: 
 
? most countries have lower per capita incomes now than they had in 
1980, in some cases even 1960 
 
? Africa’s share of world trade has declined to half of what it was in 
the 1980’s  
 
? it is the only region in the world where life expectancy is falling – 
and in a very significant manner. 
 
? and, the worst: some 40 % of its private wealth is invested abroad 
and on foreign accounts. African elites don’t trust their own 
countries and people.  
 
The result is aid fatigue and a sense of helplessness amongst the donor 
countries. Africa has become the bottom less pit, where not only money, 
but worse, ideas, commitment, strategies are thrown in to disappear without 
result. 
 
Yes, I agree for once: the multi-dimensional conflicts from Somalia to 
Angola have sadly not received the global responses that are appropriate to 
the scale of the tragedies, not to speak of the utter failure of the community 
of states in Rwanda. The successes of UN peace keeping in Africa were 
sparse, with the UNTAG in Namibia as a shining example that a stringent 
and coherent approach of preventive peace keeping, which combines the 
military element of robust force and a sustainable civilian approach for 
economic and societal recovery is the only way for a successful 
intervention. 
 
The Brahimi Report of 1999 and Kofi Annan’s Millennium Report “We the 
people” are to me amongst the many publications still the most outstanding 
studies to analyse the shortcomings and failures of muddling through in 
Africa. 
 
The EU has reacted to their recommendations with its new Security 
Strategy, the establishment of their Battle Groups embedded in a still 
ongoing drafting of a crisis prevention strategy, which accepts the “hard” 
necessities of interference with robust power, but as part of an overall 
developmental approach, linked with the necessary administrative efforts to 
provide safe and sustainable structures for the people to make their living. 
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Liberia was a good recent example, where the fruits of such a long-term 
and complex operation could be harvested.  
 
However, I would like to highlight two problem zones, which to me are of 
outstanding importance for success: 
 
1. We should be careful not to be criticised of “double standards”. 
Third World peace keeping can not be left to third world countries 
alone. The major UN troop providers under chapter VII in Africa are 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal and countries alike. The African 
Union, despite best intentions, has not (yet) the capacities, the 
efficiency, the experienced manpower required for comprehensive 
operations.  
 
2. The ultima ratio, the conditio sine qua non, without which all efforts 
are doomed to fail and were our African friends must now deliver, is 
good governance! What is good governance? The term is by no 
means vague, but very precise; it is consensus oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and 
inclusive, and above all – follows the rule of law, where differences 
are not sorted out by throwing opponents into jail – not to speak of 
other more sophisticated reactions – but in front of independent 
judges, who decide on the basis of generally accepted laws and 
whose judgement are respected. Honestly, I would not need many 
fingers of my hand to name countries in Africa, where this is the 
case. 
 
In concluding and to corroborate my opinion, I take pleasure to quote from 
Kofi Annan’s Millennium Report: 
 
“Conflicts are most frequent in …countries that are ill-governed and where 
there are sharp inequalities between ethnic or religious groups. A healthy 
and balanced economic development can only be promoted combined with 
minority rights, human rights and political arrangements in which all 
groups are fairly represented … National sovereignty must not be used as a 
shield for those who want only to violate the rights and lives of their fellow 
human beings.” 
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Dynamics of Peace and Security in Africa 
H.E. Soad Shalaby 
Ambassador of Egypt to Finland 
 
Introduction 
 
Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast 
majority of which are intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 
countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more 
than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 
million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of 
those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-
term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples. 
 
Africa is a vast and varied continent. African countries have different 
histories and geographical conditions, different stages of economic 
development, different sets of public policies and different patterns of 
internal and international interaction. The sources of conflict in Africa 
reflect this diversity and complexity. Some sources are purely internal, 
some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub-region and some have 
important international dimensions. Despite these differences, the sources 
of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common themes and 
experiences. Some are historical while others are economic or other.  
 
In this paper, I will summarize these factors as well as present the efforts 
exerted by the AU in the field of Peace and Security with a list of 
recommendations on how the EU and international community could be 
committed to help in the dynamics of peace and security in Africa. 
 
Historical Factors
 
The colonial powers partitioned Africa into territorial units. Kingdoms, 
States and communities in Africa were arbitrarily divided; unrelated areas 
and peoples were just separated or joined together by artificial boundaries. 
In the sixties, the newly independent African States inherited those colonial 
boundaries, together with the challenge that legacy posed to their territorial 
integrity and to their attempts to achieve national unity. The challenge was 
compounded by the fact that the framework of colonial laws and 
institutions, which some new states inherited had been designed to exploit 
local divisions, not overcome them. The tasks of state and nation building 
preoccupied many of the newly independent states. Too often, however, the 
necessary building of national unity was pursued through the heavy 
centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of 
political pluralism. Consequently, political monopolies often led to 
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corruption, nepotism, complacency and abuse of power. The era of serious 
conflict over state boundaries in Africa has largely passed, aided by the 
1963 decision of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to accept the 
boundaries which African States had inherited from colonial authorities.   
 
During the cold war, the ideological confrontation between East and West 
placed a premium on maintaining order and stability among friendly states 
and allies. Super-power rivalries and their interest in dominating the 
economic interests in Africa fuelled some of Africa's longest and most 
deadly conflicts. Moreover and across all Africa, undemocratic and 
oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by the competing super-
powers in the name of their broader goals but, when the cold war ended, 
Africa was suddenly left to fight for itself. Without external economic and 
political support, few African regimes could sustain the economic lifestyles 
to which they had become accustomed, or maintain a permanent hold on 
political power. As a growing number of states found themselves internally 
beset by unrest and violent conflict, the world searched for a new global 
security framework. 
 
In that same period of time, the international community was eager to 
exercise its newly acquired capacity for collective decision-making.  In the 
early nineties, the United Nations Security Council launched series of 
ambitious peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. Despite a number of 
important successes, the inability of the United Nations to restore peace to 
Somalia soured international support for conflict intervention and 
precipitated a rapid retreat by the international community from 
peacekeeping worldwide. An early and direct consequence of this retreat 
was the failure of the international community, including the United 
Nations, to intervene to prevent genocide in Rwanda. That failure has had 
especially profound consequences on international peacekeeping efforts in 
Africa.  
 
Economic Factors 
 
Unfortunately, the long historical exploitation of African wealth destroyed 
the roots of its national economies. No infrastructure was built to help to 
support the growing economies of young African nations and to be a 
backbone for its economic development. On the contrary, it has hindered 
their national attempts to overcome poverty and deprived it from achieving 
an acceptable rate of growth for their economies.  
 
The transportation networks of exports and imports were designed to 
promote the trade only to the colonial country with no direct effect on the 
local economy. Consequently, the local economy, production patterns and 
balance of trade continued to be linked with the same production patterns 
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that existed before independence. The unfavourable terms of trade and the 
focus on production of raw materials and primary commodities have done 
nothing to improve the local production and industrial skills. In addition to 
that, there was no improvement to the educational, technical skills or 
suitable training that develops the capacities of the labour force.  
 
Despite the devastation that armed conflicts brought, there were 
beneficiaries who profited from chaos and lack of accountability, and who 
may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and on the contrary they 
would strive to prolong it. Very high on the list of those who profit from 
conflict in Africa are international arms merchants. 
 
In Liberia, the control and exploitation of diamonds, timber and other raw 
materials were the principal objectives of the warring factions. Control over 
those resources financed the various factions and gave them the means to 
sustain the conflict. Clearly, many of the protagonists of wars had a strong 
financial interest in seeing the conflict prolonged. The same can be said for 
Angola, where protracted difficulties in the peace process owed much to 
the importance of control over the exploitation of the country's lucrative 
diamond fields. In Sierra Leone, the chance to plunder natural resources 
and loot Central Bank reserves was a key motivation of those who seized 
power from the elected Government in 1997. 
 
Other Factors
 
In addition to the broader sources of conflict in Africa that have been 
identified, a number of other factors are especially important in particular 
situations and sub-regions. For Example, in Central Africa, these factors 
included the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely 
populated areas. In Rwanda, for example, multiple waves of displacement 
have resulted in situations where several families often claim rights to the 
same piece of land. In African communities where oil is extracted, conflict 
has often arisen over adequate reap of the benefit of such resources, or the 
suffer from the degradation of the natural environment by unprivileged 
communities.  
 
African Peace and Security Strategy 
 
Peace and security have become a priority issue not only for Africa but also 
for the whole world and the international community in recent years. The 
international involvement in settling conflicts has become the natural way 
to solve uprising conflicts. Peacekeeping missions whether they are UN or 
AU police or military forces are actually contingents who get special peace 
keeping training to offer humanitarian assistance and save innocent lives 
from deaths and homicide.  
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Peace and security is recognized as the absolute prerequisite for sustainable 
economic development and regional economic integration and this is the 
focus of the new challenge that has been facing Africa in the recent 
decades. 
 
Currently, there are various initiatives for peace and security in Africa. 
They range from grassroots peace-building efforts to specific local, 
regional and international programs to curtail the trade in small arms. 
Equally important are the local and regional programs that are initiated and 
focused on training and providing expertise and technical assistance for 
conflict stricken areas.  
 
An excellent example of the national African initiatives that is the 30 years 
old, Egyptian Fund for Technical Cooperation for Africa, which extends 
several annual training and specialized workshops for African nationals to 
get high quality training in all fields including diplomacy and peace 
keeping missions. It also responds to the requests of the African 
governments to their needs of specialists in different fields of medical, 
scientific and educational Egyptian experts. In cases of natural disasters or 
human misery that occurs as a result of conflicts and regional wars, the 
Egyptian fund also extends humanitarian aid in the form of logistics, 
medical equipments medications and food aid. 
 
The current regional climate, where the African Union is actually in charge 
of peace and security dynamics in Africa indicate that the time is mature 
for integrating existing peace and security issues within an international 
framework. This could   be successful only if African countries contribute 
by funds and personnel in the peacekeeping missions. It is also of utmost 
importance to make full use of the officers of African police and army 
contingents by offering them suitable training and upgrading their skills. 
They should retain their essential autonomy and dynamism, at the same 
time they should be assisted financially by providing the necessary 
logistical, communication and transportation support that the AU 
contingents are lacking.  
 
The combination of the AU and NEPAD provides a framework for 
bringing peace and security issues together with transparency, self-
governance, economic development and international partnership (the core 
of NEPAD).  
 
Efforts of AU towards Peace and Security in Africa 
 
The OAU and later the AU has continuously attempted to develop and 
create its own instruments of peace and security. African countries 
expressed their continued interest in their involvement in peace missions in 
their different forms. Whether the missions are UN or EU or AU such as 
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MONUC in DRC and AMIS in Sudan all these efforts have contributed to 
the establishment of the African Standby Forces ASF. 
 
The African Union has developed its own dynamic mechanisms placed by 
the Africans themselves to intervene militarily in case of wars or conflicts. 
In case of natural disasters or emergency situations they have also 
developed early warning mechanism to protect civilians from suffering and 
later to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced victims or refugees 
in camps. Also special training took place under AU mandate for the 
African police officers that are responsible for monitoring the elections to 
ensure the safety and fairness of the election process.  
 
After the creation of AU in 2002, the new peace and security structure was 
designed. It is composed of the Peace and Security Council where Egypt 
became a member recently. The Panel of the Wise, the Early Warning 
System and the Situation Room are regional mechanism for communication 
and the creation of the African Stand By Force are also new organs in the 
system. In the field of Peace Building it has also initiated African Peace 
support capacities and established a revolving peace trust fund. These 
organs have succeeded in forming the international links and financial set 
up which the previous structure of OAU has failed to achieve.  
 
On the Economic and Social Development levels the New Partnership for 
Development of Africa NEPAD had also been established to reflect 
African governments and people’s ownership of their own modules and 
solutions of their development programs and exploitation of their human 
and natural resources. 
 
The Peace and Security Council has proved its efficiency in its 51st meeting 
by reaching to a compromise between all factions, except for two, to sign 
the Darfur Peace Agreement. This is a major breakthrough and significant 
step towards peace, reconstruction and democracy in Darfur and Sudan as a 
whole. The division of power, wealth and security arrangements will 
continue to be the source of conflict between the different factions until the 
achievement of the application of the final lasting peace in Darfur.   
 
The United Nations and the international community have supported the 
UN African Partnership by committing the UNAMIS forces due to start 
their mission next September. The strong African participation and 
commitment in principle and in character in the UN peacekeeping efforts 
and especially in this one is highly recommended. It is the guarantor to 
promote peace and security and stability in Africa. 
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The EU has been committed to the dynamics of peace and security in 
Africa first by convening EU Africa summit in Cairo in 1999 and later in 
December 2005 by adopting the strategic partnership with Africa.  The 
leaders of African States had been invited in recent years to present their 
own initiatives to be considered by the leaders of the G8. The British 
government has placed African issues of peace and security on top level of 
its African political agenda. Germany, Finland and Sweden focused on the 
importance of training and deploying rapid forces for emergency conflict 
situations in Africa. The United States administration has assumed a new 
strategic interest in Africa not only based on humanitarian needs but also 
because of its national economic interest in the natural resources of African 
countries. The US is currently importing 13% of its total oil imports from 
Africa and that percentage will be increased to 20% in the next ten years 
according to speculations.  
 
Responsibility of International Community 
  
What is critically needed now from the international community is to share 
the responsibility, support   and sustain the progress so far made in the field 
of peace and security whether by countries or by AU as a whole in Africa. 
This could be achieved by the following commitments of both sides: 
 
? Providing coordinated technical assistance to the AU and its peace and 
security organs. 
 
? Supporting the AU in developing its capabilities to deploy unarmed 
military observer missions and police operations as part of conflict 
prevention and peace support operations. 
 
? Providing financial and technical support, including flexible funding, 
for African peace support operations including transport, logistics and 
financial management capacity. 
 
? Countering terrorism in Africa, through co-operation with the AU Anti-
Terrorism Center in Algiers. 
 
? Working in partnership with the AU and sub-regional organizations by 
helping them to develop their planned Continental Early Warning 
System and implement the AU Panel of the Wise to address and mediate 
conflicts before they erupt into violence.  
 
? Maximizing the contribution of local and multinational companies who 
can direct their resources and trained staff for the issues of peace and 
security. This could be achieved through working with the UN Global 
Compact and developing OECD guidance for companies. 
 
? Improving the effectiveness of controls over transfer and illicit 
smuggling of small arms and light weapons. 
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? Support the UN Secretary General’s proposed new Peace Building 
Commission in which Egypt was recently unanimously elected to 
represent Africa in this commission. 
 
? Taking necessary steps towards coordinating reconstruction and 
reconciliation efforts in post-conflict situations to secure the non 
recurrence of sources of conflict by allocating grant financing for 
reconstruction needs, including the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian society.  
 
? Ensuring the effectiveness and the speed of the arrival of necessary 
humanitarian assistance to the needy by supporting the local regional 
and AU efforts to reach the conflict stricken areas and providing 
logistical support in the most adequate technology. 
 
? Trilateral cooperation with the EFTCA (Egyptian Fund for Technical 
Cooperation for Africa) is recommended.  
 
These are my recommendations for the efforts that the international 
community can take to help to consolidate peace and security in Africa. 
The official organs of the EU and European Non-governmental 
organizations and the private sector could help the AU strengthen its 
mandate for peace and security. This could only happen with the support of 
the local efforts of the Africans themselves so that the sustainability and 
continuity of the assistance process is guaranteed.  
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African Union´s Evolving Crisis Management Capabilities 
By Major General Henry K. Anyidoho (retired)  
Former Deputy Force Commander Of United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda, and Leader of United Nations Assistance Cell for African 
Union, Addis Ababa – Ethiopia. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Without stability there will only be war, poverty and the continued 
marginalisation of Africa and little chance for economic development and 
growth in Africa. In the meanwhile, Africans will have to prepare to share 
the burden of peacekeeping on the continent but will this happen in 
isolation from or in partnership with the global community.”(Cillers and 
Mills: from Peacekeeping to complex Emergencies.) 
 
In the past decades, the continent of Africa has been plagued with conflicts 
of varying degrees including genocide. This state of affairs has hampered 
economic and social development of many countries on the continent. As 
Africans continue to blame the condition of under-development and 
conflicts on their former colonial powers, other schools of thought have 
been asking whether Africa has not come of age to find a solution to the 
obstacles that continue to hinder its development. In the year 2000 (8 – 10 
July) in Durban, South Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
yielded place to the new continental organisation, the African Union (AU). 
Prior to that transition OAU, having found itself confronted with myriads 
of conflicts in almost all the sub-regions of Africa, formally 
institutionalised in 1993, through the Cairo Declaration, that established the 
OAU mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, as 
a vehicle for furthering the Peace Agenda of the organisation1. Naturally 
the AU inherited from the OAU, the ongoing conflicts in Africa as even 
new disputes emerged. On the whole, Africa entered the 21st century in a 
state of dilemma; freed from being a pawn in the Cold War struggles for 
power and influence, yet a prisoner of that legacy; freed from being a 
superpower battle ground, and now a battleground for the challenges posted 
at the cross-roads2. As many conflicts engulfed Africa, a number of 
initiatives emerged. One of such being the establishment of African Stand-
by Force (ASF). This idea was conceived as a result of inaction of the UN, 
OAU and the international community as a whole during the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda. The idea being that if Africa could have at its disposal, forces 
                                                 
1 Among other things, the framework mechanism established the mandates of the OAU 
Central Organ (16 member states) and the Conflict Management Division, later 
designated the Conflict Management Center (CMC) under the Political Affairs 
Department in 1999, as part of the programme of enhancing the OAU’ capacity for 
peace support missions. 
2 Josephine Odera in out of conflicts from War to Peace in Africa; p144 
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ready to intervene in conflicts within the continent, perhaps another 
Rwanda will be prevented. 
 
In the year 2000 when the AU was born, ongoing conflicts in Africa were 
mainly those of Sierra Leone, Cote d Ivore, Southern Sudan, Somalia, 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Prior to that, a 
number of sub-regional organisations within Africa, had taken very bold 
steps in confronting conflicts within their own spheres of influence. The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed 
peacekeeping troops into Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau and 
much later to Cote’ d’ Ivore. On 22nd September 1998, Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) launched operation “BOLEAS” into the 
kingdom of Lesotho in an effort to deal with the deteriorating security 
situation in the mountain kingdom of Lesotho, in 1997 an African 
multinational force deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) and 
succeeded in preventing the collapse of the state which in away maintained 
stability in the Central African sub-region3. Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) has been involved in the process of finding 
solutions to conflicts in the East African sub-region. Those sub-regional 
initiatives were in some cases supported by Western European Countries. 
Soon after its establishment, AU realised the need to harmonise all those 
initiatives for a coherent peace support operations within the continent. 
 
 
African Union’s policy of non in-deference 
 
There were a number of reasons why the OAU’s conflict resolution 
mechanisms were rendered ineffective. Foremost among these was 
organisation’s nearly unequivocal commitment to the principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference4. As a response to the ineffectiveness of 
the OAU’s mechanisms, African leaders decided in May 2001 to devise a 
new security regime to operate within the framework of the nascent AU. In 
February 2003, the AU Heads of State and Governments added amendment 
to Article 4(h) of its constitution that extends the right to intervene in 
situations that pose a serious threat to legitimate order in order to restore 
peace and stability in the member state of the Union upon the 
recommendation of the AU Peace and Security Council5. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa; capabilities and 
culpabilities p 222 
4 Kristiana Powell African Union and the Responsibility to Protect, published in 
monograph No 119, may 2005  
5 Kristiana Powell, African Union and the Responsibility to Protect, published in 
monograph No 119, May 2005 
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Establishment of peace and Security Council 
 
The African Union has prepared for its enhanced role in the maintenance of 
continental Peace and Security by establishing a Peace and Security 
Council that is tasked with identifying and dealing with threats to and 
breaches of the peace. On 25th May 2004 (African Day), the Heads of State 
and Government of the Member States of the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) of the AU met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the solemn ceremonial 
launching of the PSC. In order to back the resolutions, of the council, the 
AU has also recommended the development of a common defence and 
security policy and by 2010, the establishment of an African Stand-by 
Force, capable of rapid deployment to keep or enforce the peace6. 
 
 
AU’s first attempt at finding solution to internal crisis –  
Burundi – African Union mission 
 
African Mission in Burundi was the first peacekeeping mission deployed 
by the new continental organisation. This came about as a result of the fact 
that following the intervention of Tanzania in the pro-longed fighting 
among various factions in Burundi, some forms of basic Agreements, 
Arusha Peace and Resolution Agreement, had been signed but the fighting 
was still ongoing between the government of Burundi and the various rebel 
movements. As the United Nations was waiting for a comprehensive 
Agreement before deploying a peacekeeping force, the AU decided to 
deploy purely African force of South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique to 
Burundi. That operation called African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was 
established on 2nd April 2003. After one year in operation and following 
AU’s appeal to UN Security Council, Resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004 
establishing UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) was passed. The African 
Union having successfully intervened in Burundi and giving a practical 
meaning to co-operation between UN and Regional Organisation was 
encouraged to maintain the momentum in other parts of Africa. 
 
 
 The case of Darfur 
 
The major peace support operations so far undertaken by AU are the 
ongoing efforts in the Darfur states of Sudan. The conflict between the 
government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement to 
the south was very well known but not much was known to outsiders about 
Darfur region of Sudan until Human Rights Operators, NGOs and 
Journalists started giving persistent reports on human right abuses in 
                                                 
6 Statement of commitment to Peace and Security in Africa, issued by the Heads of 
State and Government of Member States of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, at the solemn launching of the Peace and Security Council 25 May 
2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia PSC/ahg/st.  (x)   
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Darfur. In 2004, two important world personalities then decided to visit 
Darfur. The Secretary General of the United Nations, His Excellency, Mr. 
Kofi Annan visited Darfur from 29th June to 3rd July 2004 as well as the 
then Secretary of State of United Sates of America, General Colin Powell 
on 30th July 2004. The reports of these two personalities put Darfur firmly 
on the international agenda. 
 
Prior to the visits of Mr. Annan and General Powell, AU through its own 
mediation efforts and with assistance of the Chadian government had 
secured a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) signed in the 
Chadian Capital, N’Djamena on 8th April 2004. The signatories to the 
agreement were the government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation 
Army/ Movement (SLA/M) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). 
Following the HCFA, the African Union took a decision to deploy an 
observer mission to Darfur. Initially only sixty (60) Military Observers 
(MILOBS) and 300 Protection Force were deployed and the force was 
established under the name, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The 
MILOBS as usual were to observe and report Humanitarian Ceasefire 
violations. The role of the Protection Force was to protect AMIS personnel, 
equipment and installation7. 
 
No sooner had AMIS deployed than the AU recognised how inadequate 
that force was. The capacity to provide direction and support to AMIS was 
stretched to the limit. In the communiqué adopted by the thirteenth meeting 
of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union held on 27th 
July, 2004 on the crisis in Darfur, the PSC requested the Chairperson of the 
Commission to prepare and submit to it, for consideration a comprehensive 
plan on how best to enhance the effectiveness of AMIS. That decision, 
which was taken on 20 October 2004, finally led to the creation of AMIS II 
with a new structure and also called for increasing the force level to 3320 
made up of 670 Observers, 1703 Protection Force, 815 Civilian Police 
(CIVPOL) and 132 Civilian Staff.  
 
The structure of AMIS II 
 
The structure consists of Darfur Integrated Task Force at the strategic level, 
located at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa under the authority of the 
Commissioner, AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and its role is to 
give strategic guidance to the AU Military, Civilian Police and 
Humanitarian Operations in the Darfur region of Sudan. The Mission 
Headquarters is located in Khartoum (Operational HQ for AMIS) and the 
forward Mission Headquarters is at El Fasher, the Capital of North Darfur 
(Tactical level). The purpose of the structure as a whole is to deal with the 
holistic issues at each level of command and specifically cover the subjects 
of authority, roles, responsibilities and Lines of Communication (LOC). 
                                                 
7 AU PSC/ MSC/ 2 (1) Page 3 dated 18 October 2004  
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Darfur integrated task force (DITF) -  
(See Annex ‘A’ to these notes) 
 
The DITF was established with the following roles/ responsibilities: (still 
being developed)  
 
1. Development and maintenance of strategic campaign plan 
2. Development and implementation of force generation, plans and 
policies. 
3. Development and implementation of joint force contingency plans. 
4. Development and implementation of joint personnel policies and 
plans. 
5. Development and implementation of joint intelligence policies and 
plans. 
6. Development and implementation of joint Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) and doctrine.  
7. Development and implementation of joint service support, logistics 
and sustainment plans and policies.  
8. Development and implementation of joint Civil/Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) and humanitarian plans and policies. 
9. Development and implementation of joint command, control, 
communications and information support plans and policies. 
10. Maintenance of partnership with Troop Contributing Countries 
(TCCs) and international donor community. 
11. Collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned. 
12. Maintain AU strategic situation awareness. 
13. Any foreseeable future responsibilities  
 
The stated roles/ responsibilities clearly demonstrate that the correct name 
should have been Integrated Task Force (ITF) not DITF since the 
responsibilities are wide ranging and should not be attributable to only 
Darfur. 
 
 
Role of partners an AU in the DITF 
 
The DITF was structured in such a way that the Partners Technical Support 
Group (PTSG) to be discussed later, will provide a number of experts in 
specific areas to work with AU’s own staff that will be recruited to fill the 
vacancies created by the establishment. Partners mainly from European 
Union, Canada and USA, quickly provided personnel into the DITF but 
AU’s recruitment policy is so slow and bureaucratic like that of any large 
organisation hence experts from partners arrived in Addis Ababa and 
commenced working but had no Africans to wok with. How could 
knowledge then be transferred? The experts normally arrive in Addis 
Ababa for either three or six months tour of duty. As a result some had 
come and gone without having African counterparts to work with. One 
 
 86
would have expected that the Operations in Darfur would be treated as a 
situation of emergency that must be provided with immediate operational 
requirements in both personnel and resources but that has not been the case. 
However, judging from the number of years that older organisations such 
as UN, EU NATO took to build their present levels of capacity and the fact 
that the whole AMIS operation is donor funded, the AU is perhaps trying 
its best to cope with the situation. 
 
 
Capacity of DITF 
 
As indicated earlier, even though the establishment was created, 
recruitment of qualified staff to fill the vacancies in the structure was slow 
until the Joint Assessment Team was despatched to Darfur in March 20058. 
That team was led by Commissioner, Peace and Security, Ambassador Said 
Djinnit. Other organisations/ countries were the EU, UN and USA. It was 
the report of the Joint Assessment Team that exposed the weaknesses 
inherent in the DITF and recommendations were made to strengthen the 
structure. Two very important components that were introduced into DITF 
are the positions of a Joint Chief of Staff and Administrative Control and 
Management Cell (ACMC). The report of the Joint Assessment Mission 
also emphasised production of important documents such as Standing 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) Rules of Engagement (ROE), Status of 
Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between AU and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The report of that 
Joint Assessment Team also increased the force level from 3,320 to 8,565 
comprising 6,171 Protection Force, 702 MILOBS, 1,560 CIVPOL and 132 
Civilian Staff. 
 
The deployment of that expanded AMIS is still in progress with South 
Africa commencing deployment of the last battalion. Despite logistics 
constraints, which temporarily suspended the deployment in September 
2005, the greater part of the enhanced force and CIVPOL components are 
in Darfur and indeed the first battalions in the expanded force completed 
their six month tour of duty and have been replaced. In the same vein, the 
first batch of CIVPOL have also been replaced. The Joint Assessment 
Mission report earlier on referred to also identified the need to establish a 
Joint Logistics Cell (JLOC) and Joint Operation Centre (JOC) at the 
forward mission headquarters in El-Fashier, North Darfur. JLOC and JOC 
were strongly recommended to strengthen command and control of AMIS 
in a co-ordinated manner. In December 2005, another AU led Joint 
Assessment Mission evaluated AMIS operations. Recommendations of that 
report emphasised the need to bring AMIS to its Full Operational 
Capability (FOC)9.  
                                                 
8 The Report of the Joint Assessment Mission of AMIS dated April 2005 
9 The Report of the Joint Assessment Mission of AMIS dated December 2005  
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Co-operation between AU, UN and EU 
 
In all these efforts, what level of International cooperation has the AU 
Mission been receiving? First of all the various Resolutions passed by the 
UN Security Council on Darfur place responsibility on UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) to assist AMIS. For example operative paragraph 5 of 
Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005 clearly states: 
“requests the Secretary General to report to the Council on options for how 
UNMIS can reinforce the effort of AMIS to foster peace in Darfur through 
appropriate assistance to AMIS including logistical support and technical 
assistance and to identify ways in liaison with the AU to utilize UNMIS’s 
resources, particularly logistical operations support elements as well as 
reserve capacity towards this end”. In order to fulfil the above stated 
requirement, UN Assistance Cell for the AU has been established in Addis 
Ababa which in many ways is helping to enhance cooperation between the 
United Nations and the African Union with regard to AU’s peacekeeping 
efforts. The Assistance Cell includes military, police and logistics experts 
and provides a more suitable basis for assistance that has been extended to 
date. Efforts are underway to enlarge the Assistance Cell to include 
additional experts such as in finance, budgeting and force generation that 
will be readily available to assist the AU. In addition, a UN military liaison 
officer has been attached to the African Union Ceasefire Commission 
headquarters at El-Fasher, North Darfur, UNMIS has also established 
several offices throughout Darfur to co-ordinate, and facilitate liaison and 
cooperation with African Union Mission in Darfur especially in the 
humanitarian sector. The Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) and Special Representative of Chairperson of the AU Commission, 
(SRCC) meet often in Khartoum where both are based. In April 2005, the 
Secretary General dispatched his special envoy Lakdar Brahimi to AU 
Headquarters in Addis Ababa to discuss with the AU Commission 
Chairperson the way forward with regards to the operations in Darfur. The 
Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operation Jean-Marie Gueheno 
also visited AU headquarters and Darfur in May 2005. The Secretary 
General H.E. Kofi Annan then followed with a visit to AU headquarters in 
Addis Ababa on 25 – 26 May where he co-chaired the pledging conference 
for the funding of the enhanced mission of AU in Darfur. Also present at 
the pledging conference were Secretaries General of EU and NATO. The 
SG of UN continued to Darfur to see for himself efforts being made by 
AMIS to restore stability in that region of Sudan. Currently, there is a 
proposal to hold another pledging conference in Brussels to seek for 
additional funding for AMIS.  
 
The United Nations has not been alone in level of co-operation with AU. 
There has been overwhelming goodwill from the International Community 
towards AU Mission in Darfur. At the strategic level in Addis Ababa, there 
are two important cooperative groups that meet regularly to discuss and 
assist AMIS operations. First, the Liaison Group (LG) meeting which takes 
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place at the AU on Mondays and Thursdays and often chaired by the head 
of DITF, with Senior Military, Police, and Political Affairs Officers and 
regularly attended by representatives of European Union, Canada, United 
States of America, European Union experts and UN experts. During LG 
meeting, the AU indicates its requirements and partners ask pertinent 
questions related to the support to be provided. Second the Partners 
Technical Support Group (PTSG) meeting on the other hand is normally 
held on Wednesdays chaired by a senior member of European Union 
delegation in Addis Ababa and attended by experts from the delegation, 
representatives from the embassies of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of 
America, the United Nations and NATO. At the PTSG meetings, the 
partner nation/organisation representatives discuss among themselves the 
division of responsibility in support of AMIS. The idea of establishing 
these two fora on AU Mission in Darfur is to appropriately identify the 
needs and to coordinate support for the mission. These mechanisms were 
developed from experience as initial attempts at assisting the AU were so 
fragmented and therefore tended to confuse the AU senior staff members 
instead of assisting them. Through the Liaison Group and the Partners 
Technical Support Group, AMIS has continued to receive the necessary 
funding, technical support in terms of experts and training of MILOBS, 
staff officers and Civilian Police. The August 2005 UN led MAP-
EXERCISE conducted jointly by AU, UN, EU, NATO and USA was 
another effort in strengthening command and control structures of AMIS. 
Another product of the MAP-Exercise was the involvement of Staff of 
Kenya Peace Support training Centre in Nairobi and Kofi Annan 
International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. These two 
African centres of excellence therefore benefited from the planning and the 
execution of that MAP-EXERCISE which could form the basis for similar 
exercises in both institutions. 
 
 In the second half of 2005, EU seconded a number of Senior Civilian 
Police Officers to the DITF, headquarters of CIVPOL in El-Fasher and to 
the eight (8) sectors throughout the entire AMIS area of operation. The aim 
being to train and strengthen the Civilian Police component of AMIS which 
has a tremendous role to play in Darfur if Law and order have to be 
established and policed as pertains in democratic societies. 
 
 
Funding 
 
The European Union through its Peace Facility plays the lead role in 
funding AMIS operations. The cash donation which pays the allowances of 
the staff of DITF, Military and Civilian Police observers and also for the 
Protection Force (PF) comes from the EU. Within the EU are major 
contributing countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Denmark. Norway a non-EU member constructed thirty (30) offices for the 
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CIVPOL in the IDP camps and has the proposal to construct additional 
thirty. The matrix attached as Annex ‘B’ clearly demonstrates the level of 
support from the EU as at March 2006. The government of Canada and 
United States of America are major donors outside EU. 
 
 
Training 
 
Training for AU personnel has been organised at various levels. In 2005, 
UN assisted in training staff officers for AMIS during pre-deployment 
training of UNMIS personnel at Kenya Peace Support Training centre in 
Nairobi. UK carried out training of MILOBS in Darfur and France is 
currently training MILOBS at Koulikoro in Mali. NATO also carried out 
two stages of training at the DITF in Addis Ababa and at the forward 
mission headquarters in El- Fashier. The EU police officers are currently 
training newly arrived AU police officers in Darfur. Training as a whole is 
an on-going process. Fortunately, the AU has recently recruited its own 
training officer who has the responsibility of co-ordinating all the training 
needs and the execution of such programmes. 
 
 
Major operational equipment 
 
In Darfur, apart from 658 vehicles donated by the UK government through 
the EU, (additional 452 vehicles are on order) Canada provides a total of 25 
helicopters and three (3) from Netherlands. Canada has further donated 105 
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) with a package to include fuel 
supply, ammunition and maintenance cost. These operational vehicles 
majority of which have been delivered are expected to greatly enhance the 
image and operational effectiveness of AMIS The Netherlands and 
Germany provided the bulk of communication equipments. The entire 
camp facilities (construction and maintenance) are provided by the 
government of USA and Norway has constructed thirty police stations for 
AU police in the camps for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). 
 
 
Movement control unit  
 
Since June 2005 and during the deployment of the expanded AMIS, NATO 
and EU deployed Air Movement Control personnel to Addis Ababa who 
established a Forward Air Movement Base (FAMB) and directed the air 
assets donated by EU and NATO member countries for the strategic airlift 
of Troops and Civilian Police from their home countries to Darfur. Liaison 
officers from the unit together with AU and UN officers normally carry out 
pre-deployment visits to all the Troop Contributing Countries to assist in 
the smooth deployment of troops to Darfur. 
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Current state of AMIS 
 
As much as the African Union Mission in the Sudan has tried to maintain 
stability in Darfur, the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements 
have continuously violated the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, which 
they signed on 8th April 2004. Fighting escalated in Darfur and split in the 
rebel movements degenerated into tribal affiliations and fighting. The 
government of Sudan failed to disarm the Janjaweed and sometimes 
accused of conducting offensive air manoeuvres. On the other hand the 
inter Sudanese talks in Abuja, Nigeria towards a comprehensive Peace 
Agreement continued to drag on until 5th May 2006 when the Darfur Peace 
Agreement was signed in Abuja Nigeria. The escalation of the fighting and 
increased insecurity in Darfur, compelled the African Union to indicate in a 
communiqué issued at the end of its 45th Session on 12th January 2006 the 
possibility of a transition of AMIS operations to the United Nations. 
Following that statement, UN Security Council issued a presidential 
statement on 3rd February 2006 requesting the Secretary General to initiate 
contingency planning for the transition of AMIS to UN. That proposal was 
further reiterated in a communiqué at the end of AU Peace and Security 
Council 46th Session on 10th March 2006. As these notes were being 
prepared, consultations continued in New York, Addis Ababa and 
Khartoum as to the future of peacekeeping operations in Darfur. 
 
 
Darfur peace agreement (DPA) 
 
On 5 May 2006, through the concerted effort of the AU mediation, EU, 
UN, UK, USA, Canada, Norway and personal intervention of President 
Obasanjo of Nigeria, the DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT (DPA) was 
signed in Abuja, Nigeria between the Government of Sudan and Mini 
Minawe group of SLM/A. The other faction of SLM/A of Abdul Wahid 
and JEM failed to sign the DPA. Efforts continue in Africa and elsewhere 
to get the two factions also to sign the DPA which when policed properly 
will bring a lasting peace to Darfur. There are certainly many formidable 
challenges ahead if the DPA is to produce the desired results on the ground 
in Darfur. 
 
 
African standby force (ASF) 
 
The speed with which AU despatched a mission to Darfur in June 2004, 
clearly demonstrates the need for the ASF. As indicated in the opening 
paragraphs of this presentation, the idea of establishing ASF came to the 
fore as a result of the failures in Rwanda. Twelve years have elapsed since 
then and the discussions continue. The AU has given itself a target year of 
2010 when the ASF would have become operational. As there are visible 
signs of work in progress within some of the sub-regions notably East 
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(Inter-Governmental Development Authority – IGAD), West (Economic 
Community of West African States – ECOWAS), and South (the Southern 
Africa Development Corporation –SADC), the same degree of visibility is 
not recorded in the central and the northern sub-regions of Africa. In 
working towards the realization of ASF, the G-8 partners and UN have 
been consistently concentrating on capacity building. Series of workshops 
were planned for November 2005 for developing practical modalities 
towards realisation of ASF. Since the sub-regions of Africa are responsible 
for providing the Standby Brigades for the African Union, it is essential 
that the development of the capacities of these entities are not overlooked. 
Currently, there are series of workshops being held with support of partners 
in building capacity towards the realization of the ASF. 
  
 
Capacity retained or lost? 
 
Whatever capacity is being built now with the ongoing operations in Darfur 
should become capacity retained but not lost. For example, the human 
resources being developed by the AU in handling the operations must be 
fully documented for easy future reference. There is the need now for AU 
and its partners to start thinking seriously as to the future of vehicles, 
APCs, Communication equipment and other stores donated to the AU. 
There must be a policy for the control of such items. Another important 
feature of capacity building is the mutual learning taking place between 
western armies and those of Africa. As African armies have the opportunity 
of being exposed to technological and organisational advances, Western 
European officers can also take advantage of experiences gained by African 
armies in practical peacekeeping over a decade of direct involvement.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the past decades, the region of Africa has been the one that has 
experienced and continue to experience conflicts of varying degrees 
including genocide. The first continental organisation, the OAU made some 
attempts at mediating and playing negotiation role but it was obvious that 
the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states 
hindered total involvement and bold steps in finding solutions to protracted 
conflicts on the continent. Some sub-regional organisations within Africa 
took bold decisions in trying to contain conflicts within their areas of 
influence but the continent as a whole continue to search for practical and 
effective ways of finding peace and stability. Without peace and stability 
the conflicts will continue strengthening poverty and hence marginalization 
of Africa. The African Union, since its inception in July 2000, has realised 
the need to boldly confront conflicts on the continent and therefore adopted 
the policy of non-indifference in the internal affairs of member states. In 
that regard, through the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, 
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has given pragmatic meaning to its approach to managing conflicts. The 
intervention in Burundi in April 2003 and the current ongoing operations in 
Darfur are clear manifestations of AU’s evolving crisis management 
capabilities. The organisation can however not do it alone. In this regard, 
the support of United Nations, European Union, NATO and other 
committed Western European nations will ever be needed if the desired 
goals are to be achieved. The involvement of International Partners in the 
ongoing Darfur operations is a demonstration of co-operation between 
regional organisations, the UN and International Community as a whole. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
The following points are recommended for the strengthening of the 
cooperation between African Union, United Nations and European Union 
together with other partners. 
 
? The European Union’s peace facility is a good example of helping 
African Union’s effort in peacekeeping operations. Whilst calling for 
the continuation of the EU peace facility, the AU must take useful 
lessons from this facility and establish its own assessed contribution of 
all member states. For any operation which relies solely on donor 
funding stands a risk of losing momentum towards a successful 
conclusion.  
? The United Nations Assistance Cell for the AU in Addis Ababa should 
be enlarged as soon as possible to include experts in critical areas of 
financial management, Force generation, Training and Evaluation, 
Police trainers and Legal experts. 
? Depots must be established for storing vehicles, and any item of     
equipment that are being donated to the AU in Darfur. 
? Human Resources being developed in the Darfur operations must be 
retained. 
? The African Standby Force is the surest way of rapid reaction to conflict 
situation. Every effort should be made towards its realization. 
? Other efforts directed towards training of peacekeepers at African 
centres of excellence should continue and to include pre-deployment 
training organised by the UN for AU staff officers and military 
observers. 
? The process of mediation by the AU and its partners coupled with 
negotiations among parties as was experienced in Abuja created useful 
lessons that must be retained. 
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European Security and Defence Policy, Africa and Finland’s 
EU Presidency – A Challenging Equation 
Jaana Heikkilä 
Ministry of Defence1
 
 
If I were to sum up my topic The European Security and Defence Policy, 
Africa and Finland’s EU Presidency, I would say: a challenging equation. 
To solve it, Finland has no previous experience to lean on. The first time 
we held the EU Presidency in 1999, the European Security and Defence 
Policy was just coming into existence, but at the time we did not think of 
Africa. It was not until 2003 that the continent appeared on the ESDP 
agenda as the European Union conducted its first autonomous military 
crisis management operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
  
When Finland took the lead of the Council for the second time in July 
2006, the EU had just started deploying troops to the DRC in order to 
support again the UN MONUC peacekeeping operation. But it is not only 
the DRC and crisis management operations that we are talking about when 
we refer to the European Security and Defence Policy, Africa and Finland’s 
EU Presidency. The scope of ESDP activities towards Africa is much 
broader, ranging from technical support to the possibility of deploying an 
EU battle group. These possible ESDP activities should not be seen in 
isolation from the strategic objectives of the EU and from the 
comprehensive approach for which the EU is now striving.  
 
This is why I would first like to introduce briefly the key documents stating 
the objectives and principles that guide ESDP activities aimed at 
contributing to peace and security in Africa. Then I will point out the main 
challenges with which the EU needs to cope in order to live up to its 
objectives. Finally, I will move on to the specific challenges of the Finnish 
Presidency regarding the ESDP and Africa.  
 
Coming from the Ministry of Defence, I will focus on military aspects of 
crisis management. By this I don’t mean to understate the importance of 
civilian efforts. On the contrary, I will argue in favour of a comprehensive 
approach and a better integration of civilian elements in African capacity 
building.  
                                                 
1  The views presented in this article are personal and may not necessarily reflect the 
position of the Ministry of Defence.  
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Key Documents regarding the ESDP and Africa: Objectives and 
Principles on the Paper 
 
The European Security Strategy2 underlines that Europe needs to get ready 
for a wider spectrum of crisis management missions, which is also reflected 
in the Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa3 and 
in the EU Africa Strategy.4 
 
The European Security Strategy states that Europe should take more 
responsibility for global security. The United Nations Security Council has 
the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, but the EU is committed to strengthening its co-operation with the 
UN to help states emerging from conflicts. The EU is also committed to 
enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management 
situations. This means that the EU should be prepared for early, rapid and 
robust interventions.  
 
According to the Security Strategy, one of the objectives of the EU is to be 
able to tackle the security threats posed by, for instance, regional conflicts 
and failed states. This type of crises can be found especially in Africa, 
where the conflicts of neighbouring countries are often intertwined and 
long cycles of civil war have destroyed the functioning state apparatus. It is 
obvious that these problems cannot be tackled by purely military means. In 
this respect, the EU is well equipped: it has a wide array of instruments at 
its disposal, such as political and diplomatic means, military and civilian 
assets, trade, and development policy. The challenge is to learn to use these 
existing instruments coherently.  
 
In this regard, the EU Strategy for Africa represents an important step: it 
addresses the African security and development in a comprehensive 
manner that takes into account all policy sectors from trade and 
development assistance to conflict prevention and crisis management. This 
document called “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic partnership” 
was adopted by the European Council in December 2005. This year is 
crucial as regards its implementation. We need to show that the strategy, 
which aims at the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 
2015, is more than just ambitious words. A progress report on the 
implementation of the Africa Strategy will be presented to the European 
Council in December 2006. 
 
                                                 
2 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy (15895/03), 
12.12.2003.  
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/newsWord/en/misc/78348.doc> 
 3 Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa (10538/4/04), 
16.11.2004.  
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/st10/st10538-re04.en04.pdf> 
4 The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership (15961/05),19.12.2005. 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/87673.pdf> 
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The EU Strategy for Africa is composed of five clusters: peace and 
security; human rights and governance; development assistance; 
sustainable economic growth, regional integration and trade; and investing 
in people. Regarding the peace and security cluster, various activities are 
already undertaken in the field of European Security and Defence Policy. 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, one military operation and two 
civilian missions are ongoing, and in the Darfur region of Sudan, the EU is 
supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Moreover, the 
Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa, approved by 
the Council in November 2004, covers several forms of support, such as 
capacity building, planning support, training, provision of equipment, 
operational support, and ESDP advisory or executive missions in the 
framework of UN or African-led peace support operations. 
  
Both the EU Strategy for Africa and the Action Plan articulate clearly the 
underlying philosophy of the African ownership. All EU action should be 
based on African needs and requests. In order to help the Africans to keep 
the peace in their own continent, the EU is committed to the capacity 
building of the African Union (AU) and the Sub-Regional Organisations. 
The EU is also prepared to provide direct support to the African 
organisations or to the UN through ESDP missions. According to the 
Africa Strategy, this direct support includes the potential deployment of EU 
battle groups.  
  
All three documents – the Security Strategy, the Action Plan and the Africa 
Strategy – highlight the need to support also post-conflict reconstruction. 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of combatants (DDR) and 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) are preconditions for long-term stability.  
 
 
Main Challenges regarding the ESDP and Africa: Difficulties in 
Brussels and in the Field 
 
Different sort of ESDP operations and African capacity building imply lots 
of challenges – in Brussels, in capitals and in the field. I am not trying to 
offer a complete list of these challenges but rather an idea of the obstacles 
setting limits to the EU ambitions regarding Africa. 
  
First of all, there are general structural constraints that apply to all ESDP 
missions. The crisis management structures of the EU were created several 
years and operations ago. As underlined by High Representative Javier 
Solana, the EU is currently close to the limits of its capacity.5 We would 
need more resources and more flexible financing and planning 
mechanisms.  
                                                 
5 Follow-up on Hampton Court discussions regarding certain CFSP aspects by EU HR 
Javier Solana, letter to the European Council (S416/05), 14.12.2005.  
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/87644.pdf> 
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Crisis management operations can hardly anymore be labelled as military 
or civilian, since in most cases they include both assets. At least purely 
military operations need a civilian follow-up. However, the planning and 
financing structures are still separated into military and civilian side – both 
at the EU and national level. The establishment of the Civ/Mil Cell in 
Brussels is a step in the right direction, as well as the recent proposals of 
the High Representative Solana to strengthen the assessment, planning and 
implementation capacity within the Council Secretariat. However, it will 
take time for the civil-military co-ordination as a culture to become rooted 
in all crisis management efforts. 
 
Furthermore, as emphasized by High Representative Solana in his 
contribution to the EU Strategy for Africa6, we would need better tools and 
increased financial resources for the ESDP support to African partners.  
 
In addition to the structural and financial constraints, the EU suffers from 
capability gaps – notably in the field of strategic lift. The ongoing 
capability work tries to address these recognised shortfalls, but one cannot 
expect solutions overnight. 
 
ESDP operations in Africa also have particular challenges of their own, 
such as logistical arrangements, medical care and personnel gaps. As we all 
know, Africa is a very demanding area of operation due to its extreme 
weather conditions, diseases, long distances and lack of infrastructure. For 
instance, the surface area of Darfur equals to that of France, but there are 
only two main roads. Especially during the rainy season the AU-led AMIS 
II operation is totally dependent on airlift provided by partners. 
  
High health and security risks are probably one reason for the difficulties in 
finding enough troops and other personnel to the ESDP missions in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan. Besides, many member states 
do not have that much of experience of crisis management, local conditions 
and customs in Africa.  
  
However, it is extremely important for the EU personnel deployed to 
Africa, especially in support of the African Union, to know how things are 
done the African way. The EU and Africa have a lot to learn from one 
another. This is one challenge concerning the EU support to the African 
crisis management efforts. For instance, the European experts supporting 
the AMIS operation have not always been fully involved in daily work. 
Even though they are there to provide help, they sometimes face difficulties 
in making themselves appreciated and their advice heard in a different 
cultural and organisational setting where personal contacts, for instance, are 
more important than in Europe. 
                                                 
6 Contribution by EU High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa 
(S377/05), 21.11.2005. 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/87088.pdf> 
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These cultural problems also relate to a more fundamental question of 
African ownership versus partnership and mutual responsibility. On the one 
hand, the EU has to respect the African ownership, which means that it 
should be careful and not too keen to offer its advice. On the other hand, as 
a partner, it needs to ask for mutual accountability. Although the EU is the 
biggest donor of the AMIS operation, it does not always have as much 
credibility or visibility as other partners such as the United States, Canada 
and NATO. This might be partly due to the fact that the EU has not always 
succeeded in talking with just one voice. The Commission, the EU Special 
Representative, the High Representative, the Presidency and the Member 
States with their bilateral activities can easily blur the image of the EU as a 
unified actor. Besides internal co-ordination, external co-ordination with 
partners, such as the UN, NATO and G8, is essential so that we do not 
waste scarce resources in duplicate efforts.  
 
Although I have focused on the difficulties, I do not wish to paint a gloomy 
picture for the way ahead. Realism – or rather pointing out those things that 
require further work – should not be confused with pessimism. After all, 
there are important achievements in the field of ESDP and Africa, and even 
though the EU is facing some challenges in trying to live up to its 
objectives concerning Africa, it has recognised the problems and is trying 
to address them. Besides, as the EU gains more and more experience of 
ESDP missions in Africa and identifies lessons to be learnt, the planning 
and conduct of new possible operations and supporting actions should 
become easier. On top of that, the international community as a whole is 
showing considerable political will to strengthen African capabilities. So, 
we are definitely moving in the right direction, and we hope to advance 
things further during Finland’s EU Presidency. 
 
 
Specific challenges of the Finnish Presidency: the DRC, Sudan and 
African Capacity Building 
 
During the Finnish Presidency there are major challenges ahead in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan. In the DRC, the first 
parliamentary and presidential elections in more than 40 years, and in 
Sudan, the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement represent a 
chance for peace and security. Nevertheless, these are fragile processes that 
need full support of the international community.  
 
Following a request by the UN, the EU agreed to provide timely and 
focused support to the UN MONUC operation in the DRC. This military 
operation called EUFOR RD Congo is not meant to substitute MONUC but 
to help the blue-helmets in case they face serious difficulties during the 
crucial election period, which started at the end of July. The EU has also 
reinforced temporarily its police mission EUPOL Kinshasa, since the 
maintenance of public order is a key element for the success of the electoral 
process. This police support is of an advisory nature.  
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Main challenges concerning EUFOR RD Congo relate to the fact that there 
is only a small EU force, an advance element of about 1,000 troops, in a 
huge country. However, the main responsibility for the security belongs to 
the Congolese police and army backed by 17,600 MONUC peacekeepers. 
The EU troops will always be the last resort. In this respect, two things are 
crucial. First of all, the information campaign should create a deterrence 
effect by making clear that the EU is ready to support the election process – 
even by military means, if necessary. The campaign should hold back the 
potential spoilers as well as make sure that the EU force is understood as a 
neutral force. Secondly, good intelligence is essential so that the EU troops 
can react before things get out of hand, including the possibility to resort to 
the on-call force in the neighbouring country Gabon. 
 
The polls are expected to go without major problems since the main players 
– with the exception of UDPS party – are committed to the process. 
Nevertheless, EUFOR RD Congo needs to be prepared to tackle possible 
security threats. The riskiest moment will probably be the proclamation of 
the election results as many people currently in power and backed up by 
armed groups are expected to lose. Also if the elections cannot be declared 
free and fair, there is a risk of violent contestations. Even if the results are 
widely accepted, we need to keep in mind that the Congolese are anxious 
for change. Once the new government is in place, they need some 
indications that things are getting better.  
 
After the elections, the EU will need to assess thoroughly in what way it 
can best continue to support the development in the DRC. The Security 
Sector Reform will be a top priority, since the soldiers who are not getting 
paid due to lack of resources and wide spread corruption are currently more 
of a threat than of protection to the civilians. There are estimations that 
they commit even 80 per cent of all crimes in the DRC. It is evident that 
unless the army is disciplined and able to guarantee secure conditions, all 
other aid will be a waste of money. 
 
The EU has already been active in the field of SSR. In addition to 
providing training and mentoring to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in 
Kinshasa, the EU has supported the integration of a new Congolese 
national army and the reform of its pay system. The Union’s advisory 
mission, EUSEC RD Congo, and its chain of payment project have 
succeeded in introducing significant progress with only a small 
contribution. However, this SSR mission is struggling with personnel 
shortfalls, which will need to be addressed in order to ensure its efficiency.  
 
The EU’s other main focus area in Africa is the Darfur region in Sudan. 
During the Finnish Presidency, the EU needs to support three intertwined 
processes in Darfur. The first priority is the implementation of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement (DPA). Secondly, this calls for the enhancement of the 
operational capability of AMIS operation, so that it will be able to perform 
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the new tasks arising from the peace deal. Thirdly, we need to strive for a 
smooth transfer of AMIS to the UN. In addition, the regional dimension of 
the Darfur crisis, particularly its impact in Eastern Chad, requires attention.  
 
The DPA signed in May 2005 by the Government of Sudan and the main 
faction of SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) is an important 
breakthrough in Darfur crisis. Unfortunately the other rebel movements 
have not joined the agreement, and there is a risk that the rebel groups 
could end up fighting against one another. In any case, the implementation 
of the peace deal – notably the disarmament of Janjaweed militia – will be 
an enormous challenge. The longer it takes to implement the DPA, the 
greater is the risk of violence escalating. 
 
A large and robust UN-led operation is widely considered as the only 
viable option in Darfur. The African troops have done significant work in 
severe conditions, but the AU is ready for the handover to the UN as the 
Abuja peace process has been concluded and as the organisation has other 
important challenges ahead, such as its own capacity building and possible 
new missions like Somalia.  
 
However, the reluctance of the Government of Sudan to accept the blue-
hatting of AMIS has complicated and delayed the transition process. The 
transfer needs to be carefully planned so that the UN does not inherit the 
current shortcomings of AMIS II. The EU and NATO are both continuing 
their support to the operation in view of the UN take over, and their 
experience and assets could also be of use in the transition phase. All in all, 
a close co-operation between the AU, the UN and other partners, including 
the EU and NATO, is the only possibility to stabilise the Darfur region.  
 
Interagency co-operation is a necessity also in the development of African 
crisis management capabilities. During the Finnish Presidency, the EU 
continues to support the African capacity building. In this field, the main 
project is the African Stand-by Force. The African organisations aim to 
create by 2010 a Stand-by Force, which would be composed of five 
regional brigades and civilian police elements. The ASF should be capable 
of conducting a wide spectrum of missions ranging from military advice 
and observer missions to complex peacekeeping operations and 
intervention in case of genocide.  
  
The EU has already acted as a leading partner in ASF workshops dealing 
with the doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures. The conceptual ASF 
work has proceeded well, but the challenge is to find a balance between the 
needs, the ambition level and the resources available. It is also important to 
ensure that civilian elements will be included in the concept, so that the 
African actors can develop a comprehensive approach to crisis 
management from the very beginning. In this regard, the EU is in a 
favourable position to support the capacity building process in which many 
other actors are also involved. The need for co-ordination is again obvious 
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to ensure the efficient use of resources. Each player has its own strengths, 
and there is certainly plenty of work for everyone. The division of labour 
taking place between the United Kingdom, France, Canada, the United 
States and the EU as regards the ASF workshops is a good example of this, 
as well as the Africa Clearing House organised by the G8.  
  
Better co-ordination is also needed in Brussels, regarding the Union’s 
resources and Member States’ bilateral activities. The Council Secretariat 
and the Commission have been considering together how the EU could 
better use and co-ordinate all of the existing instruments and what new 
measures could be initiated in order to enhance the EU support for 
strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts. These proposals are being considered during the 
Finnish Presidency.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it is in our interests that Africa develops into a stable and 
prosperous region. In the past few years, the European Union has started 
devoting more and more attention to the prevention and management of 
conflicts in Africa. It stands ready to conduct crisis management operations 
on the continent, when no other actors are capable or willing to do so. In 
the long term, the Union will try to ensure that the Africans are able to 
resolve their own conflicts, as African actors show clear determination to 
tackle the crises and development of the continent. The creation of the 
African Union and the efforts to build up the African Stand-by Force are 
examples of this political will.  
 
Nevertheless, Africa is likely to remain a permanent item on the ESDP 
agenda for many years to come. Also Finland will need to take into account 
the growing importance of Africa as a potential area where peace support 
operations are needed. For instance, the EU battle groups could be used to 
support the United Nations or African-led crisis management efforts in 
Africa. Also training and other expertise will be of use in African capacity 
building in which a comprehensive approach is a necessity and also the 
comparative advantage of the EU. 
  
For Finland, the ESDP and Africa related issues form a national challenge, 
since we do not have significant experience of crisis management activities 
in Africa. Our peacekeeping and training efforts have focused elsewhere, 
notably in the Western Balkans. In this respect, the EU Presidency is a 
welcome occasion for us to gain more expertise on the African conflicts 
and to promote peace and stability on the continent. 
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The Future of the European Union Peace Support Operations 
in Africa: Fatoumata Siré Diakite 
H.E. Ms Fatoumata Siré Diakite  
Ambassador of Mali to Finland 
 
 
After having heard not very beautiful images painted on Africa in different 
communications, I’m relieved to know that there is still a way forward, 
which means that everything has not yet been lost for our region. So in 
order to find ways and means to continue with the reconstruction of what 
needs to be, it’s important to acknowledge the great efforts made by some 
African countries, this was done despite difficult environment. 
 
I will start to make a very important point: Africa is not a country but 53 
countries with different cultures and historical backgrounds, like Europe. 
Yes, there are countries in conflicts in Africa but besides this, there are also 
some countries where there is stability and there are some other countries 
which gained peace and got of out long term conflicts which need to be 
recognised: Mozambique, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo Brazzaville, 
RCA, Algeria, Morocco etc. That’s the reason why the map on African 
countries in conflict should be updated. 
 
I’m proud to say that HE Mr Amadou Toumani Touré, President of the 
Republic of Mali and Late Me Alioune Blondin Beye, former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Mali played key roles in bringing peace, respectively in 
Central Africa Republic and Angola, as Special Representatives of the 
Secretary General of United Nations. HE Amadou Toumani Toure was 
member of the Group of outstanding personalities selected by UN 
Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan to be involved in the peace building 
process in Rwanda some years ago. 
 
Mali had a rebellion in its Northern region in 1990, for its resolution there 
was no external intervention to bring peace in this part of Mali. We went 
into our own traditional mechanisms to establish a long-term peace 
through: 
 
1. The signature of National Pact and the burning of 3000 arms 
voluntary collected from the rebels. 
2. The establishment of a Committee of wise people called the Elders. 
3. The establishment of a permanent dialog between the Government 
and the rebels. 
4. The nomination of a mediator whose task was to listen to both sides 
and try to bring the two positions closer. 
5. The facilitation of the meeting between the two sides until 
agreements were reached. 
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The Women groups were greatly involved in the mediation. Each side 
respected the commitments made. More than three thousands of arms were 
voluntary collected by the National and local Authorities as a proof of the 
end of the rebellion. Those arms were gathered and burned down in an 
official ceremony called “Flame of Peace”, at this place was built a “Peace 
Monument”. This ceremony was attended by many African Heads of States 
and the Representative of UN and others international and regional 
organisations. This example of Mali to bring peace through its own ways 
and mechanisms was duplicated by some African Countries. 
 
Another point I want to make is about the power and great commitment of 
African women to bring peace in different countries in conflicts in Africa 
when they are given support and consideration, they are the first victims of 
arms conflicts in every part of the world e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina when 
their opinions are never demanded when it comes to making war. 
 
That’s why March 14th, 1997 a delegation of high committed African 
women was received by the Secretary General of UN Mr Kofi Annan to 
whom we gave a Memorandum on conflicts prevention and management in 
Africa and the real involvement of women in the whole process, not when 
it’s too late as usually is the case. We commented on the participation of 
women soldiers in the UN peace-building missions and the positive 
changes they will bring within the missions. I had the honour to chair this 
delegation of African women received by UN Secretary General Mr Kofi 
Annan. 
 
This will bring me to make the following remarks. 
 
Our region is facing conflicts for different reasons. Countries involved in 
the management of those conflicts by providing troops to UN are usually 
also the ones which are selling arms to the different parties despite the 
different resolutions of UN imposing arms embargo, e.g. the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
 
So, when Africa is getting poorer and poorer because of the different 
conflicts going on, some Western and Asian countries are getting richer 
and richer from the same conflicts. The double standard policies of the 
International Community e.g. the case of Sudan, because of secular interest 
of some countries there, is the reason why it’s impossible to adopt any 
Resolution within the UN in order to bring peace, save lives and make 
accountable the Government and its allied. Africa has become a place of 
experimentation of new arms and armaments but also a “depotoire” for 
some other countries which decided to get rid of their old armaments. The 
way the International Community faces its responsibilities vis à vis the 
conflicts in Africa is questionable for its lack of real political will, the 
economic interest prevailing. Yes, I agree that Africa leadership has its own 
responsibility to assume but the International Community is also taking 
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advantages of this political, social and economic disorder going on in some 
parts of Africa e.g. case of DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) where 
enormous resources of this country have been shamefully exploited by 
some African countries with the support of the same International 
Community. UN Resolutions were adopted against those countries but who 
cares? They continued openly to exploit CRD natural resources with no 
fear of being worried one day. 
 
Then my contribution in order to really bring positive changes in the 
management of conflicts in some African countries by the next EU 
presidency. 
 
1. Recognition of progress made in Africa by some States in terms of good 
governance and democracy and sustain and encourage them to play 
“role models” in the region. 
2. Identification of the real causes of conflicts in Africa and give a lot of 
chance to prevention more than intervention for peace building. 
3. For this prevention strategies the African civil society and women 
organisations have an essential role to play in order to train populations 
at risks in particular, and the entire population on “the culture of peace 
and human rights issues and to introduce those topics in the school 
circular at all levels.  
4. To give substantial and long-term support to civil society. And NGOs to 
do this task of education and prevention of conflicts at all levels and to 
identify actions of prevention, to multiply them and bring people to 
identify the premises of conflicts. 
5. To develop and spread the concept of strategies of dialog concentration 
and consensus more than using arms which could not be a way to solve 
any conflicts. 
6. To train and select the suitable soldiers to be part of the peace building 
contingents in the regions in conflicts in Africa, the training should be 
on the physical and human environment but also on the issues of human 
rights and humanitarian laws. 
7. To help create a real complementary partnership between the different 
armed forces involved in the peace building process instead of having 
competition, suspicion which are detrimental to their missions. 
8. To have strong policy and real political will and commitment on 
different levels, nationally and internationally, against the proliferation 
of small arms in Africa, there are no industries of armaments in Africa 
but it’s easier to find any type of small arms circulating more than 
having clear water or medicine against malaria in our region. 
 
The Republic of Mali took a lead for a project of Convention against the 
proliferation of small arms in Africa within the Human Security Network. 
This Convention will need the new European Union Presidency support 
means Republic of Finland in order to make Africa a “zone free of small 
arms”. 
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Last but not the least, to support the African Union in the true and real 
implementation of NEPAD and the President of the AU Commission HE 
Alpha Oumar Konaré in  his inspiring vision to create sustainable growth in 
Africa, means to alleviate poverty, sustain good governance and democracy 
and create and maintain peace all over Africa. 
 
In conclusion, I would like to quote a former political leader who said in 
1945, I quote: 
 
“The fight for peace should be conducted on two fronts, the first is the front 
of security where to win means to get rid of fear/ fear of famine and hunger 
and of violence, the second one is the economic and social front where to 
win means to get rid of the lack of basic needs: only a victory of the two 
fronts together can guaranty to the World a sustainable peace” for wars and 
conflicts in Africa is not peace in Europe and in the rest of the world. 
 
So, is the European Union up to the Challenges? My answer is definitely 
Yes, but in a strong and genuine partnership with the African Union. 
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The Future of the European Union Peace Support Operations 
in Africa: Sirpa Mäenpää 
Sirpa Mäenpää, Director, Unit for East and West Africa, 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
 
 
Looking at crisis management from the angle of its political context in a 
given country, and as one of the many instruments by which EU tackles 
conflicts, some theses are presented: 
 
 
In military crisis management in Africa, EU is not only EU 
  
True, the development of EU autonomous crisis management capabilities, 
both military and civilian, will most likely increase the use of this capacity. 
Yet, often the first option of peace-keeping organisation in Africa is still 
today some other organisation. EU supports African Union peace-keeping 
efforts by financing through her African Peace Facility and with technical 
assistance, i.e. advisors. Our very rough estimate for the order of magnitude 
for which we have political will to support African peace-keeping by EU is 
100 Mill. Euros per year. This amount is now secured from the beginning 
of 2008 to 2010, but we still have to find funds to bridge the months till 
then. African peace-keeping has rapidly grown into a new pillar in global 
peace-keeping architecture beside UN, EU, NATO etc., and seems to be 
here to stay. The troop-contributing African countries cannot naturally be 
expected to finance alone their involvement in African peace-keeping, as 
African conflicts are an issue of collective security, for which the whole 
international community is responsible. Yet, it will take some time to find a 
permanent way of financing this new pillar. United Nations peace-keeping 
is still for the moment the best option and model for other organisations in 
many ways: its sustained financing through the assessed contributions of 
the United Nations is more guaranteed once an operation is launched; it has 
grown into multidimensional operations that include various civilian 
strands (human rights, humanitarian efforts, rule of law etc.) so that the 
conflict is dealt with in a comprehensive way; it stays longer beyond first 
peace-time elections in order to prevent the countries from relapsing back 
into conflict.  
 
EU, AU and UN increasingly cooperate not only by changing 
responsibilities of an operation in phases, but even during an operation 
commanded by one of them. 
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The scope of EU crisis management often comprises interplay of 
military and civilian efforts 
 
The general impression of crisis management as activity only by soldiers is 
obsolete. UN operations are already multidimensional. EUSR Haavisto 
earlier proudly presented the new face of EU crisis management as the lady 
policeman - an advisor to AMIS, who speaks Arabic and organises AMIS 
female policemen into networks to tackle the security concerns of the 
female refugees in the camps. Particularly the emerging fields of DDR 
(disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life) and SSR 
(security sector reform, integrating former combating militias into a smaller 
peace-time army under civilian control and establishing a police force) 
require an approach with a mix of military and civilian expertise. This leads 
to financing problems - some particular efforts could be financed by 
official development assistance, but most not, as financing for military is 
broadly not counted as ODA. There are not many financing sources that 
lend themselves to supporting DDR and SSR as comprehensive 
programmes, and often DDR and SSR processes fail for lack of sustained 
financing. This means that former combatants resort again to their arms to 
find subsistence, which doesn't come cheap to the international community 
either. 
 
 
More discussion will be needed on what is the mission of the mission 
 
What is the objective on a crisis management operation? Peace is a relative 
concept. Sometimes the aim is to reduce gross human rights violations. 
There are trends to talk about humanitarian interventions, define security in 
terms of human security at the level of communities and individuals, 
underline need of protections of civilians and the primacy of human rights. 
Discussion is carried out at this stage case by case once an operation is in a 
pipeline. More general analysis is waiting for experience to be 
accumulated. 
 
For instance electoral violence is a serious threat to peace - often it erupts 
as last flames of civil war, when those former combatants who didn't win 
the war by bullet cannot face losing also by ballot in the elections, and 
mobilise their supporters into violent riots. Yet, electoral violence wasn't 
really among the main threats discussed in public as examples of the need 
for EU or AU evolving crisis management, before the UN request to EU to 
support MONUC during DRC elections was presented and before AU 
launched a military electoral observation mission in the Comoros. 
Discussion in a democratic society is useful - clarity of values helps in 
avoiding unintended mission creeps. 
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Crisis management is one part of the management of crises 
 
One could look at conflicts as a continuum with the form of a wave - from 
low early phases into an escalating conflict rising to its eruption into 
violent war, and later reducing again when peace is negotiated and 
implemented and reconstruction started. Crisis management or peace-
keeping is particularly needed at the height of violent conflict. Yet, it is 
useful to recognise that there are many efforts of conflict prevention that 
try to impede a conflict from escalating. African Union Peace and Security 
Council follows the conflict situations in the continent and sends mediators 
to negotiate with the parties. Also the European Union makes both high-
level efforts by its top leaders of external relations, and also everyday 
patient discussions on worrying trends by the Heads of Mission of its 
member countries. Besides diplomacy, other dimensions of conflict 
prevention can be used. As many African wars are carried out for the 
natural riches of the continent, economic measures such as the Kimberley 
process for tracing diamonds that are from conflict zones can reduce the 
potential for profit through war. In another dimension, monitoring of 
human rights violations can halt the increase of these violations into 
massive scale.  
 
In summary, future peace support operations in Africa may still grow in 
numbers and in scale, but also into more comprehensive in dimensions. 
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Analytical Summary 
Tommi Koivula 
Editor of the 9th Suomenlinna Seminar Publication 
 
 
The previous pages of this volume offer a great amount of insight and a 
considerable variety of perspectives. Undoubtedly, this variety of views 
reflects the wide and partially open-ended set of questions that the 
organisers asked the speakers to address. These guiding themes of the 
seminar are presented in this book’s opening pages by Colonel Juha 
Pyykönen.  
 
Yet, in our opinion the multitude of views and perspectives was not just a 
consequence of the wide set of guiding questions provided by the 
organisers. While many ideas regarding Africa’s insecurity and EU’s role 
in it seem to be generally agreed upon, the content of this volume also 
reveals different understandings of the more fundamental issues regarding 
the causes and solutions of African security problems and EU’s role. In 
other words, while we can scrutinise EU’s role in African security from 
many possible perspectives, we also seem to have substantial fields of 
different readings and different understandings of some of the basic 
questions.  
 
That’s why we think the 9th Suomenlinna seminar and this publication in 
which most of its presentations are published, serves a purpose: in 
highlighting not just areas of agreement but also of different understanding 
and disagreement, it underlines the profound need for a further discussion 
and debate. 
----- 
 
The three articles of the first chapter highlight different aspects of African 
insecurity.  
 
In his opening text “African Crises – Challenges for International 
Community and Local Actors” Ambassador Kari Karanko discusses the 
cornerstones of peace building and sustainable peace. He emphasises the 
importance of the reconciliation process as a fundamental in the healing of 
the conflict-torn societies. 
 
In this undertaking, a number of issues should be addressed. These include 
the processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
along with the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons and 
security system reform (SSR). In addition, rule of law and the principles of 
just society play a crucial role.  
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However, he notes that these processes cannot be successful without 
engaging in well-coordinated and harmonized development efforts by all 
actors. He also emphasises that when addressing the necessary 
requirements for sustainable peace, it is very difficult to draw strict 
borderlines between various actors involved in the development and 
implementation of various tasks. Military and civilian peace keeping and 
peace building need a special emphasis for interconnectivity and efforts for 
interoperability. That’s why, there is today an unprecedented need for the 
international and regional actors, donor community and various non-
governmental actors to coordinate their activities. 
 
In the article “The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment” 
military analyst Henri Boshoff gives an overview of the vast and 
heterogeneous continent from the point of view of military conflicts. He 
points out that there are a number of both global and particular elements 
affecting the nature of current African conflicts. As a consequence, the 
African conflict environment becomes a very complex one and 
exceptionally difficult for international peacekeeping forces to operate in. 
 
This kind of environment causes certain demands for troops engaging in 
crisis management activities. Deploying on the African continent, the role 
of appropriate force design, skills in such areas as engineering, logistics, 
intelligence and communication becomes much more significant than on 
the conventional battlefield.  
 
In his article “A Sociological Perspective on the Transition from War to 
Peace” Ambassador Josef Bucher approaches the question of African 
insecurity by highlighting the role of social institutions. He notes that 
institutional failure often leads to conflicts and, in addition, ongoing 
conflicts damage the institutions further, either by intent or by neglect, 
warlordism and chaos. As a result, conflict-affected societies face an 
institutional vacuum when they move out of a conflict situation. 
 
Filling this institutional vacuum is a great challenge containing both 
difficulty and urgency. In this undertaking, he suggests that instead of 
expecting too much of law, civil society and money, which we easily tend 
to do, we should above all rescue what can be rescued locally. This means 
rescuing what is left of local institutions, rehabilitating customary law and 
mobilising local knowledge. On this basis, he concludes by raising three 
questions: how does foreign intervention affect the growth of indigenous 
institutions; how does it affect the rehabilitation of customary law, and how 
can foreign intervention help to mobilize local knowledge? 
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The two articles of the second chapter concentrate on the challenges of 
European crises management in Africa with emphasis on the operational 
and tactical side of military crisis management. It is opened by Colonel 
Nicholas Richoux’s “Africa as an Operational Environment”. He begins by 
describing the main physical, cultural and social features of the African 
continent and by noting that it is an absolute necessity for everybody 
participating crisis management operations to have a deep knowledge of 
the country where s/he is supposed to be engaged. This includes, among 
other things, sufficient knowledge of regional context and geopolitics; 
history and present situation of the conflict; the characteristics of territory 
and population; local armed forces as well as mission and the risks, threats, 
operational constraints and limits involved. 
 
To achieve these aims, he highlights the main efforts needed: those 
participating operations should be prepared to respect the others, local 
culture and customs, religion, local official and customary laws as well as 
official and customary authorities. Besides, an open-minded attitude, 
including understanding the local mental schemes is a necessary 
requirement. In addition, he points out that one should be curious and try to 
learn the local way of life and if possible strike up contacts with the 
population and adds that those manage best who are willing to be 
integrated in the local environment. 
 
Major Janos Besenyö approaches the same issue from the more grass root 
level in his article “Logistics Experiences; the Case of Darfur”, the basis of 
which are his personal experiences in AMIS II operation in Darfur, Sudan 
during the latter half of the year 2005. 
 
He discusses a number of problems and shortcomings faced during the 
operation, originating from various sources such as lacking preparation, 
insufficient management capabilities, difficulties in cultural interface with 
Africans etc. Together, these factors caused the operation severe restraints 
during his stay. To meet these shortcomings, he makes a number of 
practical recommendations regarding both the AMIS operation and the EU 
involvement in Africa in more general sense.   
 
Chapter Three contains views given in a panel titled “The Dynamics of 
Peace and Security in Africa”. There, participants were asked to give their 
perspectives to the questions of what are the main causes or underlying 
factors of security problems on the African continent, and what would be 
the appropriate relationship between the European Union and African states 
or institutions in resolving these problems. Thus, the three following 
interventions are individual commentaries to the same topic. 
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Ambassador Funmilayo Adebo-Kiencke emphasises in her article the idea 
that the causes and underlying factors of the lack of security in Africa 
countries do not have their origins in something specific to the make-up of 
the people of Africa. Rather, interference by other countries in the 
governance of many African countries with the excuse of establishing 
democracy has often caused insecurity and prevented the build-up of strong 
institutions of government and governance suitable for each country. 
 
In addition, other factors such as the consequences of slave trade, 
colonialism and neo-colonialist structures as well as global manipulations 
and weapons exportation have contributed to the present level of 
development in Africa.  
 
In her view, a desired resolution of some of these problems would be 
brought about by the collaboration of the EU with the African states and 
institutions to ensure the proper execution of the UN Charter by giving 
support to the UN and strengthening the organisation. She gives credit to 
the EU for the assistance rendered to Africa so far, but points out that much 
more is required to achieve peace and security through development. 
 
Ambassador Hanns Schumacher approaches the same questions from a 
different angle. Although recognising the many shortcomings of the 
international community in helping the African nations, he underlines the 
severe failures made by African states and leaders themselves, including 
the inability of African states and organisations to change many flawed 
structures, that were created during the colonial era and which continue 
taking little or no account of African societies that exist on the ground. He 
also criticises the inability for African states to utilise the substantial aid 
given to them during the past decades.  
 
In order to successfully tackle the present unhappy situation, he suggests 
that the efforts should be concentrated on two problem areas: first, that the 
third world peace keeping can not be left to developing nations alone and 
second, that there is an absolute demand for good governance in African 
states.  
 
The third contribution to this chapter was written by Ambassador Soad 
Shalaby. She underlines the idea that the sources of conflict in Africa 
reflect the diversity and complexity of the vast continent. Some sources are 
purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub-region while 
some have important international dimensions.  
 
Despite these differences, the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a 
number of common themes and experiences, some of which are historical 
while others are economic or other.  
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She suggests that the combination of the AU and NEPAD provides the 
most feasible  framework for bringing peace and security issues together 
with transparency, self-governance, economic development and 
international partnership. She concludes her article by proposing a number 
of steps the EU and the international community could take in order to help 
to achieve a sustainable peace and development.  
 
The fourth chapter, African and European Responses, is comprised of two 
contributions, both of them presenting a point of view of a relevant 
institution. 
 
Its first article is Major General Henry K. Anyidoho’s “African Union’s 
Evolving Crisis Management Capabilities”. He highlights the main AU 
organisational reforms compared to its predecessor, the Organisation for 
African Unity (OAU), the conflict resolution mechanisms of which were 
rendered mostly ineffective. He moves on to briefly discuss the first AU 
operations and continues by describing the ongoing AMIS operation in 
Darfur. 
 
The article contains a detailed description of Darfur integrated task force 
(DITF), its capacities and partners. He regards it along with the 
intervention in Burundi in April 2003 as clear manifestations of AU’s 
evolving crisis management capabilities. However, the support of United 
Nations, European Union, NATO and other committed Western European 
nations will be needed if the desired goals are to be achieved. To achieve 
these goals of strengthening of the cooperation between African Union, 
United Nations and European Union together with other partners, a number 
of recommendations are made in the article. 
 
In her article “European Security and Defence Policy, Africa and Finland’s 
EU Presidency – A Challenging Equation” Jaana Heikkilä notes that 
notwithstanding of the present EU involvement in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, the scope of ESDP activities towards Africa is much broader, 
ranging from technical support to the possibility of deploying an EU battle 
group. These possible ESDP activities should not be seen in isolation from 
the strategic objectives of the EU and from the comprehensive approach for 
which the EU is now striving. 
 
In her text, she shortly introduces the objectives and principles that guide 
ESDP activities aimed at contributing to peace and security in Africa. Then 
she continues by pointing out the main challenges with which the EU needs 
to cope in order to live up to its objectives, and moves on to the specific 
challenges of the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006 regarding the ESDP and 
Africa. She notes that Africa is likely to remain a permanent item on the 
ESDP agenda for many years to come and that Finland will need to take 
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into account the growing importance of Africa as a potential area where 
peace support operations are needed. 
 
The last chapter of the publication again provides views presented in a 
panel concentrating on the future of the European Union peace support 
operations in Africa. 
 
The first of the two texts is provided by Ambassador Fatoumata Siré 
Diakite, who emphasises that it’s important to acknowledge the great 
efforts made by some African countries in building a sustainable peace to 
region, despite difficult environment. 
 
She shares the view that Africa is facing conflicts for different reasons. 
Yet, she criticises countries that are involved in the management of those 
conflicts by providing troops to UN but who at the same time are the ones 
that are selling arms to the different parties despite the different resolutions 
of UN imposing arms embargo. In her view, Africa has become a place of 
experimentation of new arms and armaments but also a “depotoire” for 
some other countries, which decided to get rid of their old armaments. 
 
She acknowledges that African leadership has its own responsibility to 
assume, but her main criticism goes to the international community, 
substantial parts of which are also taking advantages of the political, social 
and economic disorder going on in some parts of Africa by utilising its 
resources. 
 
The final article of this publication is provided by Director Sirpa Mäenpää. 
In her text, she looks at crisis management as of one the many EU 
instruments for tackling conflicts. She notes that African peace-keeping has 
rapidly grown into a new lasting pillar in global peace-keeping architecture 
beside UN, EU, NATO etc. Notwithstanding of the development of 
autonomous EU crisis management capabilities, often the first option of 
peace-keeping organisation for EU in Africa is still today some other 
organisation. 
 
Today, the EU, AU and UN cooperate increasingly not only by changing 
responsibilities of an operation in its various phases, but even during the 
same operation commanded by one of them. As a consequence of the 
increasingly multidimensional nature of operations, characterised by the 
emphasis in the processes of DDR and SSR, a mix of military and civilian 
expertise is needed. At the same time, a common understanding of the 
objectives of crisis management operations remains to be achieved. 
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Yet, there are financial problems involved in the increasing emphasis on 
the multidimensional elements of crisis management. She points out that 
often the processes of DDR and SSR fail because lack of sustained 
financing. This means that former combatants easily resort again to their 
arms to find subsistence. In summary, future peace support operations in 
Africa may still grow in numbers and in scale, but also into more 
comprehensive in dimensions. However, the financial questions should be 
solved. 
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Further Reflection: In Search of a Common Agenda 
Heidi Kauppinen 
Editor of the 9th Suomenlinna Seminar Publication 
 
 
The topic of the 9th Suomenlinna Seminar was ”Promoting Peace and 
Security in Africa – Is the European Union Up to the Challenge?” The 
seminar speakers have highlighted many important aspects of this question 
in their papers.  
 
However, in order to fully tackle this complex question, we have to agree 
on certain key issues, such as what crises management in Africa really 
entails, which problems this tool is to target and who is to be the party 
ultimately responsible. In other words, finding a common understanding 
and a common agenda between the two continents is crucial in order to 
successfully address the ongoing and future crises on the African continent. 
This means to put the cat on the table and face many of the strains and 
unresolved issues that exist between the two continents. In this respect, 
addressing at least the following issues could help us forward. 
 
? Who is, or should be, the African counterpart to the European 
Union? 
? Why is it in the European Union’s interest to conduct crisis 
management operations on the African continent? 
? What are our expectations regarding crisis management on the 
African continent?  
 
Finding a common agenda between the two continents is crucial if we wish 
to see progress in the evolving co-operational relationship between the EU 
and Africa.  
 
 
Promoting Peace and Security in Africa – Is Africa up to the 
Challenge? 
 
The issue of defining who the African counterpart to the European Union 
is, or should be, has been brought up in different contexts by many of the 
seminar speakers. Both the Africans and the Europeans have stressed the 
importance of coming to an agreement on how the African continent should 
be represented when dealing with the EU in the context of crisis 
management. This question is related to an even bigger issue, the question 
of African identity. During the seminar it was frequently discussed whether 
Africa can be seen as just one entity or whether it should be seen as a 
diverse and vast continent consisting of a multitude of different nation 
states. In other words, can we talk about Africa as one compact unit? Africa 
is a vast continent full of differences and contrasts, split into of 53 states. 
Still, the idea of African identity is strong and should not be overlooked as 
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unimportant. Is it entitled to simplify and categorise all the peoples of 
Africa as just African? What does it mean to be African and how does the 
choice of identity affect the co-operational relationship with the EU in the 
field of crisis management?  
 
When dealing with the issue of crisis management, it is most important to 
have a clear understanding of the parties responsible of conducting the 
operations. If we stick to the topic of the seminar, one of the two partners, 
the European Union, is already defined. The question of the African 
counterpart remains, however. Should the EU work with every state 
separately or should there be an African umbrella organisation, 
representing the whole of Africa? The African Union represents the 
African countries and has so far been the main African partner to the EU. 
The African Union seems to claim a great deal of support and acceptance, 
both from the Africans themselves and also from their European partners. 
Although the organisation is very young and has its own problems, 
especially in the field of resources and finance, the AU still seems to enjoy 
steadily increasing confidence both by its own members and by the 
surrounding international community. For this reason alone the AU seems 
to be one of the best partners for the EU on the African continent.  
 
The previous discussion is related to another issue, the question of 
ownership and shared responsibility. Following this logic one could 
perhaps reformulate the question as: promoting peace and security in 
Africa – is Africa up to the challenge?  
 
By reformulating the question like this, the issue of African ownership 
comes to the fore. It seems quite clear that the ultimate responsibility of the 
safety on the African continent lies with the Africans themselves. The best 
way to solve problems is to solve them in the context where they appeared, 
using tools that have been created, or rather should be created, for the 
purpose of solving the problems in that conflict environment. In other 
words it might be useful to try and solve African problems by using 
African tools. This does not however mean that the Africans should be left 
alone to deal with their problems. As will presented more closely in the 
chapter ahead, it can also be most beneficial for the EU to be involved in 
crisis management in Africa.  
 
It is evident that the majority of Africa is not yet ready to take full 
responsibility of the safety and security on the African continent. This does 
not mean that this would nor should be the case for ever. The ideal situation 
would be if the peoples on the African continent, for example within the 
frames of the African Union could take care of managing the crisis on the 
African continent. The AU is showing potential of being able to become an 
effective and reliable actor on the African continent. It needs a lot of 
support from the international community, including the EU, and it is 
crucial that it receives this support. The practical division of the tasks 
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between the EU and the AU should be thought of thoroughly. The experts 
in this field can ponder more closely on the distribution of tasks between 
the two organisations, but the following notions are, however, made here. 
The African actor should be the party ultimately responsible, with the 
power to decide if and how to intervene in a crisis situation. The European 
counterpart should have mostly a supporting role. 
 
 
Crisis Management on the African Continent – The European 
Interests 
 
There are many who ask themselves, both Europeans and Africans, why it 
is in the interest of the EU to conduct crisis management operations in 
Africa. Some Africans associate this with some sort of neo-colonialism, 
while some Europeans wonder why the EU should make the Africans 
problems their own. The world is never completely black nor white. 
Today’s globalized world makes more than ever sure that ”their” business 
is ”our” business and vice versa. Even though the idea of global and 
common responsibility is important on its own, it is also important to look 
at the issue of European Union crisis management from another angle and 
reflect on the interests of the EU. 
 
It is obvious that in order to win something you have to risk something. 
This is also true the other way around. In order to be willing to put 
something at stake and risk loosing, there also must be something to gain. It 
is most bizarre that when discussing crisis management, especially in 
Africa, we usually do not talk about what there is to gain for the EU. Of 
course the idea of shared global responsibility and the will to help plays an 
important role, but realistically this concept is not enough on its own. It 
seems like it has almost become taboo for the helping party to have any 
other interests than the humanitarian value of helping per se.  
 
The fact of the matter is, however, that the EU has something to gain and 
also to protect by conducting crisis management operations in Africa. First 
of all crisis management should first and foremost be looked upon as a 
preventive tool. Crisis management is an effective tool in the sense that it is 
possible through an early and effective intervention to completely or partly 
prevent transnational security threats from appearing and evolving. It lies 
within the interest of the EU to protect its member states against threats like 
organised crime, refugee floods, epidemics and terrorism. These are 
phenomena, which rapidly appear and grow in areas of crises as the chaotic 
situation fosters their rapid growth and uncontrollable dissemination. To 
deal with these kinds of problems when they are already knocking on our 
back door, or worse when they have already entered, costs the EU 
incredible sum of money every year. It also puts a tremendous amount of 
pressure on the Union’s social system and remains on the top political 
agenda of many member states. If targeted, timed and carried out correctly, 
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crisis management can be used to if not completely prevent then at least 
limit the progress of these security threats, and thus promote the vital 
interest of protecting the union’s integrity against these hazards. The idea is 
in other words to deal with the problems where they are born, or rather 
before they are born, instead of dealing with fully grown, escalated 
problems on our own territory. This fact alone makes the conduct of crisis 
management operations in Africa a European interest. 
 
From an integrational point of view, one might want to stress the fact that 
the only area where any real progress is being made inside the EU at the 
moment is the area of the European Security and Defence Politics (ESDP). 
The EU is eager to test its new capabilities at the same time as the need for 
success in any area is growing. Critically, one can argue that the EU is 
desperately in need of successfully solving crises outside its borders, as it 
clearly does not seem to be able to solve crisis within its own. There is a 
need to prove the importance of the union’s existence. As the need for 
success is big but the room for failure is small, the union is keen on finding 
conflicts which will enhance its prestige through success, like the ongoing 
operation in Democratic Republic of Congo, but which still are not too 
difficult and in which the risk for failure still would not be too big. The 
current crisis in Darfur could be such an example. 
 
Regardless of from which angle one chooses to look at the European 
union’s activities in relation to crisis management and Africa, it is 
important to note that the EU naturally has interests it wants to promote. 
Assuming otherwise would be naive.  
 
 
What are Our Expectations Regarding Crisis Management? 
 
Among the issues to be pondered upon are the expectations regarding 
military crisis management in Africa. What effect do we expect the crisis 
management operations to have? Do the parties’ expectations match or do 
they differ? Are our expectations realistic or are we expecting too much of 
the crisis management concept? It is clear that military crisis management 
as such cannot be the cure for all the problems on the African continent. In 
order to avoid feelings of failure, dissatisfaction and frustration on both 
sides, it is important to reach a common understanding on what exactly we 
wish and can achieve through the crisis management concept.  
 
The fact is that crisis management is a very limited tool to work with. As a 
preventive tool it is effective, if used and timed correctly. Still one can’t fix 
social problems like poverty and corruption by using military crisis 
management. These problems require bigger tools to work with, tools 
which the Africans themselves first and fore most need to create in order to 
make them as effective and the results as lasting as possible. However, 
military crisis management is effective and important in the sense that 
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problems, even big ones like the ones mentioned above, can be prevented 
before they are given a chance to grow. At its best a well carried out crisis 
management operation can bring peace and control into very difficult and 
chaotic situations, which slowly in time will foster bigger problems. There 
are no limits to human desperation and there are little moral boundaries 
when it comes down to the very basic question of survival. Human 
desperation is a most effective breeder of big problems. Crisis management 
strives towards relieving the situation of desperation and chaos before it has 
the chance to escalate and become uncontrollable. This is what we can do 
with crisis management; prevent problems before they are born in a certain 
time, in a certain place. We cannot, however fix the same problems that 
have already occurred, that would be expecting too much of crisis 
management. 
 
 
The Common Agenda 
 
Finding a common agenda on crisis management is one of the most 
important, urgent and challenging tasks that lie in front of the two 
continents’ new co-operational relationship. Discussion forums, such as the 
9th Suomenlinna Seminar, are important as they give representatives from 
all sides an opportunity to exchange views and ideas and thus work towards 
finding a more concrete form of co-operation in the future. Finding a 
common agenda between two partners as different as Africa and Europe is 
hard but necessary. This task involves finding a suitable partner for the EU 
to work with and coming to an agreement on the effective division of tasks. 
It also involves an objective and realistic reflection on the effectiveness and 
usefulness of the tools we have to work with when fighting peace and 
security threats on the African continent. It is also important to start 
looking at the European – African relationship as a partnership that entails 
mutual gains for both partners. Partnership is a keyword. So is time.  
 
On one hand, time is something that many of us don’t have, especially the 
people suffering under the pressure of crisis. That is why the EU and her 
African partner need to act fast.  
 
On the other hand, there can’t seem to pass enough time, for either of the 
two parties to put the facts of history behind them and start thinking about 
the future. History is important, it defines in many ways who we are and 
where we came from. History should not be forgotten, but, it should, 
however, be reflected on in a realistic way, so that we can see the lessons 
that should be learned instead of clinging on to facts that can’t be helped 
and can’t be changed. History is important, but there comes a point when 
history needs to be left alone, so that the future may be better than the past.  
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10.10  Opening Remarks: Colonel Juha Pyykönen, Director of DSDS 
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  European Union Special Representative to Sudan 
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  Ambassador Kari Karanko, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of  
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  Chair: Pekka Sivonen 
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